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Hong Kong has experienced a significant transformation
in its understanding of business, which concerns the phe-
nomenon of social ventures that attempt to combine a
make money and do good approach and to apply business
skills to address social needs. Social ventures live a mysti-
cal existence, as they are fully ignored from a legal per-
spective despite the recent reform of laws on charitable
activities. This causes problems as to their general under-
standing, which the authors try to address with their own
typology, systematically characterizing social ventures.
Then the authors examine the legal environment of social
ventures in Hong Kong and identify the challenges they
face. Hong Kong's company law and related public/admin-
istrative law issues are considered. The answer searched
for is: what is the appropriate legal vehicle for social ven-
tures, and what are the practical legal questions when a
social venture wants to structure its make money and do
good business? As to the first problem, the legal non-exis-
tence of social ventures results in coupled privileges-
meaning a system which favors traditional business forms
such as for-profit and not-for-profit companies and dis-
courages doing good approaches by social ventures. The
authors identify instances where privileges crediting char-
itable activities are coupled with not-for-profit status, and
propose solutions under which social ventures could be
registered and have tax privileges efficiently assigned by
a one-stop supervision body. As to the second problem, the
situation of social ventures abandoning their mission of
doing good poses further challenges to the legal system,
and the authors propose a regime under which business
organizations can easily adopt or abandon a social mission
based on a partial application of the cy-pr~s doctrine. The
authors come to the conclusion that the social venture sec-
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tor bears immense potential for Hong Kong as well as for
all of Asia. But in order to use this potential, Hong Kong
has to show a more refined understanding and has to be
open to a profound discussion.
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Social venturing "is a business of conscience. The logic of requiring a
conscience programme to operate according to the law of the jungle
practised in the commercial market is one entwined with great contra-
dictions. Exactly because of this, when we talk about the development of
social enterprises, we must think about providing the soil suitable for
them."1
1 Official Record of Proceedings, H.K. Legis. Council 8434-35 (June 14, 2006)
(statement of Ms. Li Fung-Ying). The author of these words, spoken during legisla-
tive works on Charity law reform in Hong Kong, actually used the term "social
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INTRODUCTION
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("Hong Kong")
is well known as the hub for typical charitable activities in Asia and
has recently experienced an interesting transformation to a new form
of social activity which may be best described as "social ventures." The
phenomenon of social ventures brings a make money and do good ap-
proach together and thereby attempts to apply business skills to ad-
dress social needs. There are around 350 social ventures in Hong
Kong,2 with the most renowned among them probably being Diamond
Cab, offering affordable taxi carriage services in wheelchair accessible
cabs3 and Dialogue in the Dark, offering "the opportunity to interact
with and gain a new understanding of the visually impaired."4 The
change in the charitable landscape of Hong Kong has been both sup-
ported and triggered by an impressive growth of organizations such as
Social Ventures Hong Kong,5 the HKCSS HSBC Social Enterprise
Business Center,6 and the Social Enterprise Summit,7 which attempt
to nurture social change in Hong Kong from an institutional perspec-
tive. The subject has also been introduced by local universities-a re-
sponse which further underlines the importance of this trend.'
While this shows that social ventures are well established in
Hong Kong, they are simply regarded as non-existent from the local
enterprise" but referred to the problem which we will be further referring in this
paper as to "social ventures". The terms social venture and social enterprise are
often used interchangeably. However, in this paper we will refer to social enter-
prises and social ventures as distinct phenomena. We will further address all ter-
minology complexities that, to some extent, have contributed to insufficient
insight into the position of social ventures in Hong Kong's legal system which, we
believe, was overshadowed by the discussion on social enterprises.
2 See SOCIAL ENTERPRISE BUSINESS CENTRE, http://www.sebc.org.hk/sits/default/
files/general/SEDirectory_2013.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
3 See DIAMONDCAB, http://www.diamondcab.com.hk/en/about.php (last visited Oct.
3, 2013).
4 See DID HK LIMITED, http://www.dialogue-in-the-dark.hk/web/subpage.php?
mid=10 (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
5 See SOCIAL VENTURES HONG KONG, http://www.sv-hk.org/about.php (last visited
Oct. 3, 2013). Social Ventures Hong Kong is an organization aiming to provide
support to "social purposes organizations" or "social enterprises" in Hong Kong.
6 See HKCSS-HSBC SOCIAL ENTERPRISE BUSINESS CENTRE, http://www.hsbc.com.
hk/1/2/cr/community/projects/sebc (last visited Oct. 3, 2013) ("The HKCSS-HSBC
Social Enterprise Business Centre, Hong Kong's first business centre to promote
cross-sectoral collaboration on social enterprise development, was newly launched
to offer diverse services to the social enterprises in Hong Kong with participation
of business volunteers including HSBC employees as mentors.").
7 See SOCIAL ENTERPRISE SUMMIT, http://www.ses.org.hk/about/message (last vis-
ited Oct. 3, 2013).
8 See infra Section 2.1.
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legal perspective.' Many in Hong Kong still see the world of business
organizations in black and white and solely differentiate between not-
for-profit entities, hereinafter referred to as social enterprises, and for-
profit entities without a social mission. This does not do justice to the
idea of social ventures which entails profit-driven business together
with a social mission. Social ventures, therefore, face numerous practi-
cal problems such as (i) lack of government commitment in promoting
and supporting their development through policy, (ii) lack of clear pub-
lic understanding and an officially recognized definition, (iii) lack of an
appropriate legal and regulatory framework to facilitate the sector's
development, and (iv) difficulties in gaining access to finance.10
Despite these problems, the Hong Kong authorities have
largely ignored the needs of the growing local presence of diversified
social ventures in terms of a friendly legal environment.1 1 This seems
odd because the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong ("Law Com-
mission") recently launched the reform of the charity law12 from which
the issue of social ventures, despite some overlapping features with
charities, was completely excluded. 3 Social ventures therefore still
are here between Scylla and Charybdis, and still numerous questions
as to their legal definition, the appropriate legal vehicle, tax treat-
ment, and specific company law issues all remain unanswered. While
the overall outcome of the reform and many detailed new regulations
are yet to be announced, it is already clear that the Law Reform Com-
mission missed out on a chance to define a framework for social ven-
tures and thereby place Hong Kong as a pro-active jurisdiction when it
comes to dealing with more social approaches to business. Given the
9 Official Record of Proceedings, supra note 1, at 8434-35.
10 LEGIS. COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, PANEL ON WELFARE SERVICES, BACKGROUND BRIEF
PREPARED BY THE LEGIS. COUNCIL SECRETARIAT FOR THE MEETING ON 9 JANUARY
2012, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT IN H.K., LC Paper No. CB(2)717/11-12(05)
at 2, Ref: CB2/PL/WS, (Jan. 3, 2012) [hereinafter PANEL ON WELFARE SERVICES]. A
different source considers 1) high production costs, 2) high rental costs, 3) lack of
staff, 4) low public awareness, 5) lack of financing channels, 6) difficulties in man-
aging disadvantaged staff and 7) small niche markets as the main difficulties en-
countered by social ventures. POWER OF GOOD, HONG KONG SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
LANDSCAPE STUDY 2012-2013 7.
11 Official Record of Proceedings, supra note 1, at 8434-35.
12 CHARITIES SUBCOMM., THE LAW REFORM COMM'N OF H.K., CONSULTATION PAPER
CHARITIES 100 (June 2011) (There are 3,229 approved charities in Hong Kong with
the majority of them having an annual income of more than HK$200,000) [herein-
after CHARITIES SUBCOMM.].
13 Id. at 2 (In June 2007, the Chief Justice and the Secretary for Justice asked the
Law Reform Commission "[t]o review the law and regulatory framework relating
to charities in Hong Kong and to make such recommendations for reform as may
be considered appropriate" which resulted in the appointment of a sub-committee
to review the subject in September 2007).
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dynamically evolving landscape of charitable activities toward social
ventures as their potentially primary tool in the foreseeable future, we
reckon the deficiencies of the reform could undermine the role of Hong
Kong as the hub for charitable organizations in Asia.
The aim of this article is to initiate a legal discussion about
social ventures in the regional context. Our argument starts by concep-
tualizing the idea of social ventures unbiased with the features of any
specific jurisdiction. In the second section, we identify current
problems requiring solutions. We explore the legal environment of so-
cial ventures in Hong Kong, as far as there is one, and illustrate how
existing social ventures operate in a legal vacuum. In the absence of
any specific social venture rules, we examine rules established in other
common-law jurisdictions.
Once we identify outstanding problems, we move to analyzing
solutions. In the third section, we consider the problem of so-called
coupled privileges, meaning a system which offers privileges only to
not-for-profit entities, which thereby excludes social ventures. In this
respect, we assess tax and administrative law and propose that all
privileges be decoupled. Further, we suggest a new system for the re-
gistration and supervision of social ventures and granting of privileges
that reward their missions. In the fourth section, we answer the far-
sighted question of the consequences of social ventures ending their
mission in the event that, as we propose, social ventures are granted
privileges rewarding their mission as a result of decoupling. We pre-
dict that it could be a particularly delicate issue in the case of social
ventures that have financially benefited from privileges and thereafter
deliberately abandon doing good.
In terms of methods, our focus on Hong Kong is supplemented
with a comparative examination of rules of other common law jurisdic-
tions, particularly the United States, where the phenomenon of social
ventures first emerged in legal scholarship and consequently led to a
new branch of law. We partially source the solutions offered from those
developments and examine how they could fit into the local system.
Our proposition is not to import foreign concepts but to show that
there are substantial questions calling for a profound discussion if
Hong Kong is to take social ventures seriously.
1. SOCIAL VENTURE CONCEPTUALIZATION
Before we discuss social ventures in the context of Hong Kong's
regulatory environment and its deficiencies, we attempt to explain the
diffused meaning of the concept of social ventures. Social ventures
bear several specific and unique characterizations which we regard as
their constituting elements. Instead of putting forward our own defini-
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tion, 14 we propose a typology with four features, which are essential
for the classification of social ventures in the first subsection. In the
second subsection, we discuss incomplete scenarios under which social
ventures bear only some of these four features. In the third subsection,
for the sake of terminological clarity, we draw the line between social
ventures and the very popular term of corporate social responsibility.
By doing so, we also intend to elucidate terms like charity, donative
charity, commercial charity, and social enterprise and to explain how
these differ from each other and from the notion of social ventures.
To better illustrate distinctive features of social ventures we
will often refer, in different configurations, to a simplistic hypothetical
example of a social venture, the business model of which is to produce
or trade shoes. On the income and make money side, it sells some por-
tion of shoes, and on the mission and do good side, it hands shoes to
those in need.
1.1. Four Features of Social Ventures
The first feature draws the line between social ventures and all
types of charities. Social ventures and charities as organizations dis-
tinguish themselves regarding the allotment of surpluses. Charities do
not pay out any part of generated surpluses as profits to their stake-
holders. In the case of social ventures, there must be some balance
between a portion of surplus allotted for doing good and a portion be-
ing paid out as profits in whatever form.1 5
14 See Christopher C. Archer, Comment, Private Benefit For The Public Good: Pro-
moting Foundations Investment in the "Fourth Sector" To Provide More Efficient
and Effective Social Missions, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 159 (2011); Symposium, Corporate
Creativity, The Vermont L3C & Other Developments in Social Entrepreneurship:
The ROLE of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59 (2010) [hereinafter Corporate
Creativity]; Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise
Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337 (2009) [hereinafter Law and Choice]; Thomas Kelley,
Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of America's Tangled Non-
profit Law, 73 FORDAm L. REV. 2437 (2005) [hereinafter Vulgar Charity]; Roger
L. Martin & Sally Osberg, Social Entrepreneurship: The Case for Definition, STAN.
SOC. INNOVATION REV. 29 (2007).
15 This includes dividends, interests, rents, stock options, salary bonuses or any
measurable benefits other than flat salaries. Formally, not-for-profit companies
may pay out considerable quasi-profits to their stockholders in some no-dividend
forms, especially salaries. Even so, strict constraint on paying out profits by chari-
ties often implies that the management's salaries are expected not to be excessive.
See Corporate Creativity, supra note 14, at 95 (2010). Similarly, Hansmann de-
fined a non-profit organization as "in essence, an organization that is barred from
distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it,
such as members, officers, directors, or trustees." See Henry B. Hansmann, The
Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980).
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However, problematically, business organizations can generate
so called shared or blended value by doing good at no expense to their
profits. 16 For example, such a spin-off effect happens when production
methods are implemented primarily in order to reduce production cost,
but at the same time, they are not only cheaper but also more environ-
mentally friendly. This is also the case when products are linked to
some social mission and the profits are the spin-off of this social ap-
proach. Namely, in the case of our hypothetical shoe business, the bus-
iness organization could perhaps not break entry barriers in developed
markets, which were set up by the established brands, if it did not
promote itself via its social mission. Again, in such a case, virtually no
profits are sacrificed to do good. Instead, profits can only be made be-
cause the social mission of the business organization is its basic mar-
keting tool. Even so, the good is still done, and true social ventures
shall be known by the good they actually do rather than by the inten-
tions they have.1 7
Presentation of the second and the third feature requires that
we first introduce the concepts of donations sensu stricto and donations
sensu largo. Donations sensu stricto denominate donations in tradi-
tional meaning that are deeds of gifts and charitable sales meaning
donations in exchange for goods of negligible actual value.is Attracting
money in such a form is similar to fundraising, as no business methods
are involved in it. Charities mostly generate income in such a way and
16 Shared and blended value are interchangeable terms. We follow Kramer &
Porter's approach according to which shared value "involves creating economic
value in a way that also creates value for society by addressing its needs and chal-
lenges." See Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, -The Big Idea: Shared Value:
How to reinvent capitalism-and unleash a wave of innovation and growth, HARv.
Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 4. But see Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise
And the Dual Mission Dilemma, 35 VT. L. REV. 105 (2010) (defines blended enter-
prise as an "entity that intends to pursue profits and social good both in tandem
and by making considered choices to pursue one over the other." That is not re-
quiring the social goals to be at no expense of the profits).
17 See Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624 (1888); Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner,
The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2064(2007); Vulgar Charity,
supra note 14, at 2472 (2005).
18 In Hong Kong, such meaning of charitable sales has been reflected in Summary
Offences Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 228, 1, §§ 4(17)(i)-(ii) (H.K.). Under the section
heading, "Nuisances and Miscellaneous Offences", it specifies that: "Any person
who without lawful authority or excuse- (... ) (17) organizes, provides equipment
for, or participates in any collection of money or sale or exchange for donations of
badges, tokens or similar articles in a public place except under and in accordance
with a permit issued- (i) for a collection, sale or exchange for charitable purposes,
by the Director of Social Welfare; Or (ii) for a collection, sale or exchange for any
other purpose, by the Secretary for Home Affairs; (...)".
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may be called donative charities.1 9 In turn, donations sensu largo de-
scribe a price premium that consumers agree to pay over the market
price for products or services because of their conscience about the so-
cial mission of these products. It implies that attracting money in such
form is part of their business method and charities generating income
mostly in this way may be called commercial charities.20
Thus, the second feature draws the line between social ven-
tures and donative charities. As noted in the previous paragraph, the
income of a donative charity is typically completely derived from dona-
tions sensu stricto. Social ventures, on the other hand, just like com-
mercial charities, would usually take a price premium that clients of
such businesses agree to pay over the market price. Clients in devel-
oped markets may want to pay more for shoes being aware of the social
mission pursued by the seller which is offering shoes to individuals
residing in developing markets for free or at a discount.2 1
The third feature draws the line between social ventures and
for-profit business organizations without any mission by differentiat-
ing between them as to the source of their income. Income of social
ventures and charities is, partially or wholly, made up of donations
sensu largo. In contrast, income of ordinary business organizations is
generally completely generated by charging market prices for products
or services.
The fourth feature distinguishes between social ventures and
any other organization doing good. Social ventures would typically cre-
ate good and not simply buy it. This may happen by offering dis-
counted prices or by offering services meeting social needs that
otherwise would not be offered at all. In our hypothetical case, a social
venture would offer the shoes below cost of production and thereby cre-
ate a market that meets social needs and that would not exist at all if
shoes were offered at market price. In turn, a charity, either operating
a business or not, would typically buy good by making pecuniary dona-
tions and giving shoes in developing markets for free. Interestingly, if
we look at the phenomenon of venture philanthropy or socially respon-
sible investment (SRI),2 2 some investment firms prefer to invest in so-
19 With regard to not-for-profit organizations, similar differentiation has been of-
fered by Hansmann, who proposed that not-for-profits, which receive their income
mostly in the form of donations, should be referred to as donative; whereas those
receiving their income mostly as prices charged for services, should be referred to
as commercial. See Hansmann, supra, note 15, at 840.
20 Id. at 840-41.
21 In fact, there are many other non-obvious ways in which social ventures can
receive donations, for instance, employees agreeing to work below market wages.
See Corporate Creativity, supra note 14, at 93.
22 See generally, Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? Apply-
ing Traditional Corporate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13
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cial ventures and agree to lower profit rates or greater risk rather than
simply donate to social projects based on a similar conviction. Obvi-
ously, the creation of good does not strictly imply that the goods or
services are being distributed for free, or at lower costs, but can also be
characterized so that closer attention is being paid to social or ecologi-
cal sustainability in their supply chains, purchasing sustainable prod-
ucts or services with eco-labels,2 3 or by improving conditions of
employment.
The interesting question in this context is whether we should
only regard businesses as social ventures that address needs which are
relatively new to the general developments in a given society and
which have the potential to address social change. Consider the exam-
ple that orthopedic shoes for children are not discounted: offering them
in poor markets still brings real change while in most emerging mar-
kets it does not any more. Moreover, if we look at, for example, the
entire healthcare sector, and specifically at nursing homes or hospices,
these meet very old social needs. There are both for-profit organiza-
tions and commercial charities that operate in these sectors. Suppose
both offer exactly the same social services to the same extent subsi-
dized with governmental money. While a commercial charity would be
seen as pursuing a social mission, the for-profit, or partly-for-profit,
organization would probably not deserve being called a social venture.
So the answer to this question is probably yes, social ventures are ex-
pected by the public to bring more change than commercial charities.
Another very valid question is how tightly the business meth-
ods and the pursued mission should be linked. Probably no one would
object if our hypothetical social venture sold other products in devel-
oped markets, but still with a view to providing free or affordable
shoes elsewhere. Say, instead of selling shoes it could generate income
on the sales of t-shirts in the developed markets and, by doing so, it
could finance its social mission focused on shoes for the developing or
undeveloped markets. Where and how this money is being generated
may be any method within the boundaries of the law. It should be ir-
relevant whether an entity produces organic vegetables, tobacco, gen-
erates atomic energy or, as in our hypothetical example, produces
shoes. The criterion should be that the business organization makes
money to support its mission. How it makes this money is not of issue.
TENN. J. Bus. L. 221 (2012) (on the concept of "venture philanthropy"); Betsy Brill
& Susan Winer, The Changing Philanthropic Landscape: What It Means for Advi-
sors, J. PRACTIcAL ESTATE PLANNING 33 (2008-2009) (on the concept of "venture
philanthropy); Benjamin J. Richardson, Fiduciary Relationships for Socially Re-
sponsible Investing: A Multinational Perspective, 48 AM. Bus. L. J. 597 (2011) (on
SRIs).
" See Corporate Creativity, supra note 14, at 89, 100. (A good example of such an
approach would be Honest Tea and Guayaki in the United States).
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1.2. Imperfect Social Ventures
The strong presence of three of these four features, with the
remaining one not being fully developed or completely absent, would
still always qualify an entity as a social venture. We call them imper-
fect social ventures. In the first scenario, a social venture may charge
only market prices without any price premium (donations sensu largo)
for shoes in developing countries. However, it can still allot a signifi-
cant portion of its surplus to offer those products at discounted prices
elsewhere, if their margin profitability in developed markets is high
enough.
In the second scenario, suppose a social venture accepts dona-
tive payments from benefactors from time to time and does not charge
any price premiums. Donations made to a social venture are then only
sensu stricto. Even so, the revenue of a social venture is mostly gener-
ated on sales of shoes at market prices. Some portion of the generated
surplus combined with the mentioned donations sensu stricto can sub-
sidize discounts on shoes offered in developing markets.
In the third scenario, there can be a significant imbalance be-
tween a portion of surplus paid out as profits to stakeholders and a
portion devoted to doing good. The only requirement is that the por-
tion of surplus paid out as profits to stakeholders can never be equal to
zero, but it might be close. In any case, a charity always ends up as a
social venture where profits are to be paid out. In contrast, on the
other side of the spectrum, the portion of surplus allotted to do good
can equal zero when doing good is achieved by generating perfect
blended value.
In the fourth scenario, a social venture could buy good rather
than generate good. It could distribute shoes for free in developing
markets or reimburse those in need for such purchases instead of cre-
ating a new market for affordable shoes. Yet if we look at the preced-
ing scenarios, we will see that the model way is to offer discounts for
shoes instead of distributing them for free.
As in the first scenario, in the fourth scenario, our hypothetical
shoe business would not rely on any price premiums on the income
side and would allot probably insignificant portion of its surpluses for
pecuniary or in-kind donations. It would rather constitute a kind of
corporate philanthropy, meaning an ordinary business with a spin-off
charity.2 4 As in the second scenario, in the fourth scenario, our hypo-
thetical entity would be a donative charity. Its actions would come
down to transferring money from donors to those in need whereby no
business methods at all are used to do good.
24 See Law and Choice, supra note 14, at 347 (distinguishes between corporate
philanthropy, socially responsible businesses, and social ventures); Plerhoples,
supra note 22, at 228-29 (elaborates on the social enterprise spectrum).
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The third and the fourth scenarios need to be considered in two
variants. If profit distribution is close to zero, such an organization
would hardly be distinguishable from a commercial charity, at least for
external observers. In turn, when all good done is consumed in the
form of blended value, it would partly make again a kind of corporate
philanthropy whereby some portion of good is created at no expense
and some presumably insignificant portion of surplus is allotted to buy
good instead of being paid out as profits.
1.3. Social Ventures versus Socially Responsible Business
For the sake of clarification it also should be stated that social
ventures partially overlap with the widely used notion of corporate so-
cial responsibility ("CSR") and the terms are usually distinguished by
reference to their business strategy.2 5 Businesses are only considered
to be social ventures when the social mission is an inherent part of the
business model.26 In the opposite, if the social mission is only part of a
short term, or at best medium term strategy, the venture cannot be
classified as a social venture.2 While this is true in principle, it does
neglect large corporations with integrated social considerations, social
ventures which abandon their mission,2 8 and those that adopt one long
after they are established. If we were inclined toward any theory at all,
it would be-as summarized by Katz and Page-the criteria of size,
meaning that CSR generally refers to large and established businesses
and social ventures to developing enterprises.2 9
Some confusion is also added by using different words with the
same meaning. But, to be clear, terms such as blended value, triple
bottom line, fourth sector, or hybrid organizations are mostly inter-
changeable with the notion of social venture and usually carry the
same meaning.30
25 See Dana B. Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2450
(2009).
26 See id. at 2451; see also Law and Choice, supra note 14, at 351-53.
27 Cf. Reiser, supra note 25, at 2451-52 ("Google Inc. has social commitments, per-
haps more than most companies of its age and size. Yet, in the general range of its
business, these do not have an equal place with building a financially successful
company. Profit and business imperatives figure too strongly in Google Inc.'s over-
all decision making to view the entire company as a social enterprise.") (foot note
omitted)
28 See infra, Part VI.
29 Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social
Responsibility?, 34 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1351, 1379 (2011).
30 See Archer, supra note 14, at 159-60.
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1.4. Conclusion
In this section we have presented social ventures as a concept
which brings a make money and do good approach together that can be
realized with divergent business models. We proposed that social ven-
tures, in principle, can be characterized by (i) the equilibrium between
its surpluses allotted for paying out profits and for pursuance of its
mission; (ii) some reliance on widely comprehended donations, espe-
cially price premium; (iii) non-reliance on strictly comprehended dona-
tions like charitable sales; and (iv) the creation of good, usually along
with creative and innovative approaches to solve social problems
bringing actual social change. We have also clarified the notion of
charities, which are mission-driven entities that do not pay out profits,
do not incorporate business methods, and mostly rely on donations
sensu stricto.
2. CHALLENGES FOR HONG KONG
We have seen in the previous section that social ventures are,
in their most basic understanding, a seemingly contradictory complex
entity which attempts to make money while at the same time also at-
tempts to do good. As such, it needs to find its place in the regulatory
environment of the jurisdiction in which it operates. The traditional
bipolarity of the company law strictly and rigidly differentiates be-
tween a company which is for profit and a company which is not for
profit. This is still the case in Hong Kong. Social ventures, however,
need to operate exactly within these two different approaches and are
neither purely not for profit nor simply for profit.
In this section, we examine the development of the social ven-
ture sector in Hong Kong and explore the local government's position
towards social ventures. We show that Hong Kong has not yet caught
up with the development and still has an unrefined understanding of
social ventures. Then, in the second section, we move to identifying
actual problems that need to be solved. We explore the legal environ-
ment of social ventures in Hong Kong, as far as there is one, and illus-
trate how existing social ventures operate in a legal vacuum. We
examine the different options social ventures have when choosing the
appropriate legal vehicle and describe the dilemma they face. In the
absence of any specific rules as to social ventures in Hong Kong, we
offer examples of other common-law jurisdictions. In the third section,
we explore the legal dimension of doing good and ask the question of
how good is recognized by the law. We conclude that Hong Kong is
highly restrictive in this regard and does apply unfavorable tax mea-
sures when businesses attempt to combine a make money and do good
approach. Finally, we make a suggestion as to what a system taking
these aspects into consideration could look like.
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2.1. Ambiguous Approach of the Government and Legislative
Council
The first governmentally supported efforts in the social ven-
ture arena date back to 2001 when the Social Welfare Department
launched a program to enhance employment of people with disabilities
through small social ventures.3 1 A delegation was sent abroad in 2007
to study the subject of social ventures3 2 and conducted comparative
research on policies abroad. 3 Further efforts followed by the Commis-
sion on Poverty between 2005 and 2007 which attempted to integrate
unemployed persons into the job market. 4 In 2006, the government
formulated the promotion of social ventures as a new policy agenda3 5
and a forum on social ventures was organized by the Home Affairs
Bureau in 2007 which confirmed further support in this direction.3 6
The Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion ("Legislative Council") took up the issue for the first time in 2006
and passed a motion concerning the promotion of social ventures by
means of, among others, raising awareness and eliminating adminis-
trative barriers.3 The first summit on social enterprises initiated by
the government was organized in 2008 and has since become an impor-
tant annual event with global outreach.3 ' An advisory committee was
set up in 2010 and a start-up funding program and a cross-sector col-
31 LEGISL. COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, LEGISL. COUNCIL OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, SUBCOMM. TO STUDY THE SUBJECT OF COMBATING POV-
ERTY: DEV. OF SocIAL ENTER., at 3, LC Paper No. CB(2)2385/06-07(01) (July 6,
2007).
32 LEGISL. COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, LEGISL. COUNCIL OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, DELEGATION OF THE SUBCOMM. TO STUDY THE SUBJECT OF
COMBATING POVERTY, REPORT ON THE DUTY TO VISIT TO. STUDY THE EXPERIENCE OF
THE DEV. OF SOCIAL ENTER. IN SPAIN AND THE U.K., at 1, LC Paper No. CB(2)393/
07-08 (Nov. 28, 2007) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL DEV.].33 Id.
34 DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL ENTER., supra note 31, at 3.
15 Id. at 4.
36 Id. at 3; see also Advisory and Statutory Bodies Under the Purview of the Sec.
for Home Affairs, HOME AFF. BUREAU, http://www.hab.gov.hk/en/related-depart-
ments organizations/asb5O.htm (last updated Oct. 25, 2013).
37 Official Record of Proceedings, supra note 1, at 8414. Further motions were
made later. See LEGIS. COUNCIL OF H.K. SPECIAL ADMIN. REGION, MOTION ON "URG-
ING THE GOV'T TO MAKE EFFECTIVE USE OF THE SURPLUS AND PLOUGH IT BACK INTO
THE CMTY." (JAN. 24, 2007) (Statement of the Hon. SIN Chung-kai). Official Record
of Proceedings, H.K. Legis. Council, at 2554 (Dec. 5, 2007) (Motion on Promoting
social enterprises).
38 See generally Background, Soc. ENTER. SUMMIT, http://www.social-enterprise.
org.hk/ses20l2/enlbackground.html (last visited May 4, 2013); Message from the
Chair, Soc. ENTER. SUMMIT, htt[://www.ses.org.hk/aboutlmessage (last visited Oct.
3, 2013).
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laboration program were launched in 2006 and 2008 respectively.3 9
Among all these efforts, around HK$500 million in total were provided
in the form of start-up funds for the support of social ventures. 40 This
governmental support has boosted initiatives at the social venture
frontier and raised the number of social businesses from 222 in 2007 to
406 in 2013.41 The social objectives of social ventures in Hong Kong
mainly concern the creation of jobs and the training of disadvantaged
persons.4 2 The most renowned among them is probably Dialogue in the
Dark HK, Ltd., which attempts to empower people with visual impair-
ment and operates globally as a franchised business of Dialogue Social
Enterprise.4 3 Other examples of social ventures include Diamond
Cab;4 4 Fullness Christian Social Enterprise, which helps delinquent
youth re-socialize through Christianity and vocational education;45
and Green Monday, which promotes an environmentally friendly lifes-
tyle, especially by advocating a green diet.46
This growth has been supported by two other noteworthy orga-
nizations: Social Ventures Hong Kong47 and the HKCSS HSBC Social
Enterprise Business Centre,48 which provide support to meaningful
businesses and nurture social change in Hong Kong. Meanwhile, the
study of social ventures has also been implemented in the curricula of
local universities which reflects a growing need of talents for the social
venture market. "The Road to Social Entrepreneurship" at Chinese
University of Hong Kong,4 9 the "Social Innovation Academic Series" °
or the lectures on "Management for Social Enterprises" taught at Hong
39 Legis. Council Panel on Welfare Servs., Development of Social Enterprise, at 1-
2, LC Paper No. CB(2)1429/10-11(04) (April 11, 2011); see also, PANEL ON WELFARE
SERVS., supra note 10, at 3.
40 This consists of the following: HK$50 million for enhancing employment of peo-
ple with disabilities; HK$150 million for the launch of a "Enhancing Self-Reliance
Through District Partnership Programme"; and HK$300 million for promoting the
development of "social capital." See LEGISL. COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, LEGISL. COUN-
CIL OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, SUBCOMM. TO STUDY THE
SUBJECT OF COMBATING POVERTY: REPORT ON DEV. OF Soc. ENTER., AT 6-7 LC Pa-
per No. CB(2)2390/07-08 (June 27, 2008).
41 See POWER OF GOOD, supra note 10, at 3.
42 Id. at 4.
43 DID HK LIMITED, supra note 4.
44 DIAMOND CAB, supra note 3.
45 FULLNESS SALON, http://www.fullness.salon.hk (last visited May 3, 2013).
46 GREEN MONDAY, http://www.greenmonday.org.hk (last visited May 3, 2013).
47 SOCIAL VENTURES HONG KONG, supra note 5.
48 HKCSS-HSBC SOCIAL ENTERPRISE BUSINESS CENTRE, supra note 6.
49 See GESC 2230 The Road to Social Entrepreneurship, SHAW COLLEGE, http:fl
www.shaw.cuhk.edu.hk/index.php?option=comcontent&view=artice&id=168%3
Agesc-2230-the-road-to-social-entrepreneurship&catid=8&Itemid=464&lang=en
(last accessed Mar. 5, 2013).
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Kong University are such examples. 1 The Hong Kong Social Enter-
prise Challenge (HKSEC) also targets university students and tries to
inspire their involvement in the sector by means of competition. 2
Despite this tremendous increase in significance of social ven-
tures in Hong Kong, social ventures have been largely ignored and
treated as simply non-existent in the recent charity reform.53 To date,
the reform process has been mostly content with identifying elements
which Hong Kong does not have but other common law jurisdictions do
have. Specifically, the absence of statutory definitions of a charity and
charitable purposes, 4 and the lack of a concise system to register, '5 5
supervise,5 6 regulate, and enforce penalties were identified as major
flaws of the previous system. The resulting patchwork collection con-
sists of rules devised for not-for-profit companies and for-profit compa-
nies and raises doubts as to the rule of law for social ventures.
50 See SONOVA INSTITUTE, http://www.sv-hk.org/sonova-institute.php (last visited
Mar. 5, 2013).
51 See Management for Social Enterprises, UNIV. HONG KONG, http://www.hk-
sef.org/files/files/SocialEnterpriseCourse.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
52 See About HKSEC, HONG KONG SOCIAL ENTERPRISE CHALLANGE, http://hksec.
hk/page/about-hksec (last visited Mar. 5, 2013); see also Social Enterprise Chal-
lenge a Rare Chance for Students and Fresh Graduates to Shine, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, September 27, 2010.
53 CHARITIES SUBCOMM., supra note 12, at 2. (In June 2007, the Chief Justice and
the Secretary for Justice asked the Law Reform Commission "To review the law
and regulatory framework relating to charities in Hong Kong and to make such
recommendations for reform as may be considered appropriate." which resulted in
the appointment of a sub-committee to review the subject in September 2007.).
54 Hong Kong's understanding of charity has still been mostly shaped by the 1892
decision of the House of Lords in Pemsel - which categorized charitable purposes
into (i) the relief of poverty, (ii) the advancement of education, (iii) the advance-
ment of religion, and (iv) any other purpose not falling under these three heads
(Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners v Pemsel [18911 AC 531, at 583
(HL)). The changing landscape of charitable activities made many charities fall
within the last, vague category. Hence, the Recommendation 2 of the Consultation
Paper proposed that prospective statutory definition of charitable purposes should
also include, among many others, the advancement of health, the saving of lives,
the advancement of citizenship or community development, the advancement of
the arts, heritage, culture or science, the advancement of environmental protec-
tion or improvement, or the advancement of animal welfare etc. CHARITIES SUB-
COMM., supra note 12, at 2.4-2.7, 12-13, point 3.5-3.7, 12, chap. 5, 42-80.
55 Id. at point 2.17-2.18, 16, point 3.8-3.9, 24; and chap. 7, 91-101, Recommenda-
tion 4, 102.
56 Id. at point 2.24-2.41, 18-22, point 3.10-3.12, 25, chap. 8, 103-119. and chap. 12,
166-178; see also id. at Recommendation 6, 111, Recommendation 7, 112, Recom-
mendation 8, 114, Recommendation 13, 135-36.
57 Id. at point 8.44-8.51, 116-118; see also id. at Recommendations 9, 10 and 11,
116-118.
16 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:1
Needless to say, this status quo does not correspond with the picture
that Hong Kong legislators and policy makers want to see. What we
suggest is a more sensitive understanding of the topic, not a tabula
rasa, but a fresh approach that takes the particularities of social ven-
tures into consideration.
This general enthusiasm for support programs offered to social
ventures surprisingly does seem to comply with the immature and un-
refined understanding of social ventures in Hong Kong's legal circles.
An early definition by the Legislative Council conceived social ven-
tures as a simple not-for-profit business organization, 58 yet self-con-
tradictorily equated social ventures with for-profit firms fulfilling a
business, environmental, and social role.5 9 The same authority later
regarded a social venture as "a business with primarily social objec-
tives [in which] ... surpluses are mostly reinvested for that purpose in
the business or in the community, rather than maximizing profit for
shareholders and owners." 0 It did not put forward a definition of so-
cial ventures but recognized three constituent features: "(a) pursuit of
social objectives through adopting entrepreneurial strategy and busi-
ness model; (b) engagement in business/trading activities: social enter-
prises should provide goods and services in return for income; and (c)
social enterprises should primarily be positioned to achieve social
objectives, and reinvest the profits in the enterprises."6 1 In turn, for-
mer Chief Executive Donald Tsang put forward another definition
which, despite being very descriptive, probably expresses quite accu-
rately how social ventures are conceived in the Hong Kong context:
Social enterprises can be developed in multiple ways,
and successful social enterprises share three common
features: Like commercial interests, a social enterprise
has to be run in such a way as to generate revenue from
the provision of services or products. It should be busi-
ness-minded, operate on a continuous basis and adapt to
market changes to be financially self-sustained; social
enterprise sets specific social objectives, such as provid-
ing products or services for the elderly or the poor. They
create employment and training opportunities for the so-
cially disadvantaged. They protect the environment, or
fund other social services organizations through the prof-
its earned; profits should principally be reinvested in the
business or in the community to help achieve specific so-
58 Id. at 2.
59 Id.
60 REPORT ON DEV. OF Soc. ENTER., supra note 32, at 4.
61 Id.
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cial objectives. Maximizing profit is not the ultimate goal
of a social enterprise.6 2
These exemplary attempts reflect the yet unrefined under-
standing of social ventures in Hong Kong. It is a constituting criterion
of social ventures that these are partly for-profit and partly not-for-
profit with the inherent mission to create social change. The defini-
tions given above, however, ignore that social ventures are neither of
the two. They are a mixture in between, a combination of the two and
not exclusively for-profit and also not exclusively not-for-profit. There
are principal differences between the two, and being either for-profit or
not-for-profit has significant implications on a social venture. How-
ever, the definitions suggested by the Legislative Council and by the
former Chief Executive of Hong Kong still incorrectly equate social
ventures with simple not-for-profit companies. The social objectives
pursued by social ventures also leave too much room for interpretation
and it is unclear what objectives are critical for a social mission. The
definitions are too unrefined and do not acknowledge their constitut-
ing characteristics.
2.2. Dilemma of Appropriate Legal Vehicle
Choosing the right vehicle is one of the most essential, and
most complicated, legal questions when social ventures structure their
make money and do good business. The problem is that the Hong Kong
company law does not offer any legal vehicle that can accommodate
such a dual business approach. In bipolar understanding, business or-
ganizations have traditionally been classified-tertium non datur-as
either for or not-for-profit.63
In the following section, we compare the different legal vehicles
available for social ventures by first juxtaposing for-profit entities with
not-for-profit entities. In the second and third step, we explore differ-
ent ways of combinations between for-profit and not-for-profit entities
as options to circumvent the numerus clausus of company law.
2.2.1. For-Profit versus Not-For-Profit Entity
The dilemma caused through this black and white approach is
that social ventures, while being in fact partly for-profit, or wholly (if
doing good is achieved only by generating blended value),64 are stig-
matized with typically being deemed for-profit irrespective of their so-
cial mission. This has implied their ineligibility for special tax
62 See Hong Kong Social Entrepreneurship Forum, What is a Social Enterprise in
the Hong Kong Context?, Soc. ENTREPRENEURS NEWSLETTER, Dec. 18, 2010, at 9.
63 See Julie Battilana, Cheryl Dorsey, Matthew Lee, & John Walker, In Search of
the Hybrid Ideal, 10 STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 51 (2012).
64 Malani & Posner, supra note 17, at 2020.
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treatment, public fundraising, governmental supports, accurate
branding of their social cause, and other benefits enjoyed by chari-
ties.6 5 Furthermore, donors have not been able to agree to compensate
talented managers with share profits of entities they support, and
their managers have not been able to motivate their employees to work
harder without similar incentive.6 6 Operating social ventures within
the for-profit legal framework has also brought up corporate law issues
such as the duty to maximize profits of directors towards their inves-
tors6 7 or the preservation of social mission in the event of takeovers. 68
In order to benefit from the non-profit status, social ventures may
adopt a not-for-profit vehicle in the early stage of operation when they
do not generate much income anyway. In that case, however, they
would encounter the most difficult problem of limited access to capital
because they cannot attract equity investors.69 It is therefore not sur-
prising that the lack of any legal recognition has widely been identified
as the gravest obstacle to the development of for-profit social entrepre-
neurship elsewhere, especially in the US.70 Nevertheless, due to the
on-going trend towards social entrepreneurship, Hong Kong has built
up some experience of how traditional legal forms can be used to oper-
ate for a social mission. The result is a variety of options which all
have some pros as well as some cons.
On the one side of the spectrum, there are a number of vehicles
tailored for running charities that can be classified in two groups,
purely donative charities and commercial charities. While purely don-
ative charities, such as unincorporated associations7 1 or Chinese Tem-
ples,7 2 cannot accommodate all business operations, they are not
suited for social ventures and therefore fall outside of our analysis.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 2019.
67 CHARITIES SUBCOMM., supra note 12, at 6.34.
68 Id.
69 See The Hauser Institute for Civil Society, HARVARD UNIV., http://www.
hausercenter.org/chinapo (discussing the start-up process for a social enterprise)
(last visited Dec. 28, 2013).
70 Malani & Posner, supra note 17, at 2020.
71 Associations of this kind have no legal entity and therefore cannot enter into
contracts, sue or be sued, in the association's name or on its behalf therefore a
business activity cannot be operated within their framework. CHARITIES SUB-
cOMM., supra note 12, at 90.
72 In Hong Kong, Chinese Temples operate under Cap 153 (Chinese Temples Or-
dinance) specifically tailored for them and can only generate revenue, apart from
accepting donations the purpose of worship cultivation or communication with
spirits or fortune-telling, by selling joss candles or incense sticks. See Chinese
Temples Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 153, 2, § 6(c) (H.K.); see also Societies Ordinance,
(1997) Cap. 151, 2, § 2(b) (H.K.) which is a sort of charitable sales rather than
offering services.
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Commercial charities, on the other side, which can be either registered
societies7 3 not-for-profit corporations, or charitable trusts,"4 fall under
the restriction of Section 88 of the Inland Revenue Ordinance. 75 Ac-
cordingly, these entities can only be officially recognized as charitable
organizations if the majority of the benefits and profits derived from
business or trade are applied towards charitable purposes and are not
expended substantially outside of Hong Kong.76
On the other side of the spectrum there are a wide panoply of
legal vehicles originally meant to be for-profit, some of which might be
used to do good. Sole proprietorship, for example, is a business carried
out by a single person for gain. 77 Partnerships, either general or lim-
ited, also exist to make a profit.78 Companies can be established for
any lawful purpose, whether the company has been established for or
not-for-profit. 79 The specific form of a company limited by guarantee is
predominantly used as a vehicle for pursuing charitable objectives. °
But, in order to be officially recognized as charities, companies need to
conform to the Inland Revenue Ordinance, and thus have to be estab-
lished as not-for-profit. Similarly, the purpose of a trust is flexible: it
is, by definition, a trustee holding property for the benefit of benefi-
ciaries or for some purposes permitted by law.$" In order to officially
qualify as a charitable trust, however, it must only be established for
charitable purposes, not for anybody's profit.8 2 Even though these
principally for-profit entities could theoretically be registered as chari-
ties, they lose one of their essential characteristics, the ability to dis-
tribute profits back to the investors, a necessary part of the concept of
social ventures.
73 See CHARITIES SUBCOMM. supra note 12, at note 6.6, 82; see generally Societies
Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 151 (H.K.).
74 See CHARITIES SUBCOMM., supra note 12, at pt. 6.12-6.13. 83-84; see generally
Trustee Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 29 (H.K) (the ordinance governing the use of
trusts); Busines Registration Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 310, 3, § 3(5) (H.K.) (the ordi-
nance governing general rules for the registration of business including trusts).
75 See Inland Revenue Ordinance, (2012) Cap. 112, 154, § 88 (H.K.).
76 Id.
77 See Business Registration Ordinance, (1999) Cap. 310, 3, § 3(1)(a) (H.K.).
78 See Limited Partnerships Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 37, 2, § 6 (H.K.); Partnership
Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 38, 1, § 3(1) (H.K.).
79 See Companies Ordinance, (2008) Cap. 32, 6, § 4(1) (H.K.).
80 Id. at § 4(2)(b); see also VANESSA STOTr, HONG KONG COMPANY LAW, 5-6 (8TH ED.
1998).
81 There is statutory definition of a trust in Hong Kong. See FINANCIAL SERVICES
AND THE TREASURY BUREAU, CONSULTATION PAPER: REVIEW OF THE TRUSTEE ORDI-
NANCE AND RELATED MATTERS 5, 1.1 (JUNE 2009), for how a trust is understood
under common law.
82 See Inland Revenue Ordinance, (2012) Cap. 112, 154, § 88 (H.K.).
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Membership clubs, which are in principle established for the
benefit of their members, may nonetheless be capable of pursuing a
social mission. Membership clubs in Hong Kong, formed either as soci-
eties or corporations, or under special statutes, are in principle meant
to afford their members facilities for social interaction or recreation.8 3
Along with these primary goals, these clubs also pursue charitable
purposes, as exemplified by the Hong Kong Jockey Club.8 4 Despite this
very laudable approach, this should not be regarded as a social ven-
ture, even though the management receives salaries instead of profits
and the members in effect buy services instead of holding shares. S5
Vehicles accommodating cooperative movements that emerge
to solve social problems via mutually organized self-help are even
more problematic to assess. Co-operative societies 6 have as their ob-
ject "the promotion of the economic interests of [their] members in ac-
cordance with co-operative principles."8 ' Based on these goals,
including the Rochdale Principles, 8 only limited interest on capital
contributions can be distributed back to members. 9 Moreover, based
on Hong Kong law, cooperatives can contribute up to ten per cent of
their annual net profits to any charitable organizations.90 Similarly,
credit unions, being a kind of cooperative organization, are established
to receive savings from and make loans to their members.9 1 To ensure
that paradigms of limited gains on capital and also of social mission
are met, dividends and loan interest rates are statutorily limited to six
per cent yearly 92 and one per cent monthly.9 3 However, unless cooper-
atives also buy good with their profits for their non-members, coopera-
tives are unlikely to qualify as social ventures.
83 See Business Registration Ordinance, (2011) Cap. 310, 1, § 2(1) (H.K.).
84 The HKJC is a company limited by guarantee and promotes horse racing. It
also pursues a social role and contributes an average of HK$1.2 billion per year
back to the community through its charitable trust (The Hong Kong Jockey Club
Charities Trust). See The Hong Kong Jockey Club Charities Trust, THE HONG
KONG JOCKEY CLUB, http://www.charities.hkjc.com (last visited Mar., 4 2013).
85 Id.
86 See generally Co-Operative Societies Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 33, 1, § 1 (H.K.)
(the ordinance governing co-operative societies in Hong Kong); THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CO-OPERATIVE ALLIANCE, STATEMENT ON CO-OPERATIVE IDENTITY (1996).
87 See Co-operative Societies Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 33, 2, § 4 (H.K.).
88 See INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATIVE ALLIANCE, THE ROCHDALE PRINCIPLES OF CO-
OPERATION (1937) available at www.uwcc.wisc.edu/icic/orgs/ica/pubs/studies/The-
Present-Applications-of-the-Rochdalel/The-Rochdale-Principles-of-Co-operation-1.
html.
89 Id.
90 See Co-operative Societies Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 33, 7, § 34 (H.K.).
9' See Credit Unions Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 119, 2, § 3 (H.K.).
92 See id. at 10 § 46(1).
93 See id. at § 41(1).
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It could also be questioned whether collective non-altruistic
and self-help effectively fall within the meaning of doing good at all.
But similar to entrepreneurs who treat social goals as a tool to make
some moderate profits but still resolve social problems, we could an-
swer that fruits of their activities matter more than their intentions.
2.2.2. For-Profit and Not-For-Profit Entity
Another way through the "law of the jungle"9 4 is to build spe-
cific multi-entity organizations, contractually linking for-profit organi-
zations with charities, issuing different classes of shares or drafting
tricky shareholders' joint venture or side agreements.9 5 These options
are confined to theoretical existence because grassroots social entre-
preneurs cannot afford legal advice on the formation of any of these
variants.9 6 Combinations of for-profit and not-for-profit companies are
another option but seem excessively arduous, timely, costly, and le-
gally uncertain, and, therefore, unsuitable for social ventures.9 7
2.2.3. For-Profit in combination with a Not-For-Profit Entity
A brief comparison with the legislation of the United States
("U.S. legislation") shows, once again, that Hong Kong is not aware of
the dimension of social entrepreneurship. Over the last few years,
three different legal entities which are specifically designed for social
ventures were adopted: the low-profit limited liability company, the
benefit corporation, and the flexible purpose corporation. A low-profit
limited liability company, or L3C, is a for-profit company with a "non-
profit soul."9' It merges elements of a for-profit entity with elements of
a not-for-profit entity, meaning the ability to distribute profits to in-
vestors together with a charitable or educational purpose. 9 The bene-
fit corporation, while a for-profit entity, tries to make a beneficial
impact on the public.100 It offers several interesting provisions, such as
rules as to the purpose, accountability, transparency, and right of ac-
tion, which are specifically defined to foster the work of social entre-
94 In the same words of Ms. Li Fung-Ying. See Official Record of the Proceedings,
supra note 1 (statement of Ms. Li Fung-Ying).
95 See Law & Choice, supra note 14, at 365.
96 See id. at 365-66.
97 See id. at 341.
98 Integrated Care Management L3C, What is the L3C?, www.icm3.org/ PDFs/
L3C.pdf, (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
99 See Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Truth About Ben and Jerry's, STAN.
Soc. INNOVATION REV., (2012) at 39, 42; see generally Law and Choice, supra note
14, at 371-75; Katz & Page, supra note 29, at 1362-1365.
100 Katz & Page, supra note 29, at 1362.
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preneurs. 10 1 Based on these provisions, directors are liable to the
stakeholders and shareholders if they fail to pursue the beneficent im-
pact.102 The third option, the flexible purpose corporation, serves as a
watered down version of the benefit corporation. It simply requires the
corporation to carry out a special purpose, such as a charitable, scien-
tific, or religious mission. 10 3
In summary, and as a short answer to our previous question,
social ventures may choose any legal vehicle available for their incor-
poration but each has some significant detriments. A combination of
for-profit and not-for-profit is possible, but not realistic because of the
anticipated costs in the legal set-up.10 4 Specific legal entities, such as
the low-profit limited liability company from the U.S., as a combina-
tion of for-profit with not-for-profit entity is another option but does
not exist in Hong Kong.105 Thus, the dilemma remains of choosing the
appropriate legal vehicle for social ventures.
2.3. Purposes versus Objects of Activity
Based on the current legal framework, it is unclear how doing
good, in other words the social mission, of social ventures can be un-
derstood and characterized. People regard doing good differently.
Some might say that giving kids in need free shoes, as in our hypothet-
ical social venture, is not really doing good, while others might still
regard it as such. There also are social activities that are not good
enough. It is therefore clear that not any good qualifies as good in the
context of social ventures.1 0 6 But then, what is good ultimately and
how can doing good be conceived in a legally relevant form?
A short digression into the Hong Kong charity law is helpful for
such a characterization. Section 88 of the Inland Revenue Ordinance
states that the trade or business carried out by a charity needs to ex-
press the objectives of the charity. 10 7 A charity needs to work towards
its charitable objectives, which in a traditional way pertains to the pro-
motion of charitable purposes. The definition of "Charitable purposes"
in turn relies upon the fossil decision of 1892 by the House of Lords in
101 See Angus Loten, Can Firms Aim to Do Good if it Hurts Profit?, WALL ST. J.
(April 10, 2013, 8:23 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873
240107. See generally, What is a Benefit Corp. ?, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., http:/!
www.benefitcorp.net (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).
102 Loten, supra note 101; BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., supra note 101.
103 Corporate Creativity, supra note 14; Law and Choice, supra note 14; Vulgar
Charity, supra note 14; Plerhoples, supra note 22, at 248-50.
104 Law and Choice, supra note 14, at 347.
105 Vulgar Charity, supra note 14, at 2463.
106 See infra section 3.5 (The qualification of the social mission is also important
under the section of Registration).
107 Inland Revenue Ordinance Advance Rulings (1999) Cap. 112, § 84(a) (H.K.).
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Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners v. Pemsel, which classi-
fied charitable purposes into (i) the relief of poverty, (ii) the advance-
ment of education, (iii) the advancement of religion, and (iv) any other
purpose not falling under these three heads1 0 ' The Law Commission
recently updated these charitable purposes and suggested the inclu-
sion of the advancement of health, the saving of lives, citizenship or
community development, art, heritage, culture or science, environmen-
tal protection, and the improvement or advancement of animal
welfare.109
The landmark case Church Body of the Hong Kong Sheng Kung
Hui v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, however, confused the practi-
cal differentiation between charitable objectives and charitable pur-
poses.1 1 ° In this case, the Anglican Episcopal Church (Hong Kong
Sheng Kung Hui).1 and its subsidiary foundation (The Hong Kong
Sheng Kung Hui Foundation)1 1 2 disposed of luxury apartments rais-
ing questions as to the resulting tax bill amounting up to HK$180 mil-
lion.1 1 3 The High Court obscurely rejected the very legitimate
argument that the criterion must pertain to whether the charity used
its revenue solely for charitable purposes, which in this case was the
advancement of religion.1 14 Behind this reasoning lays the wrong opin-
ion that the activities carried out by Sheng Kung Hui must be quali-
fied as an activity for the "purposes of trading or business," rather
than advancement of religion. 5 This, however, is not the case. 1 16 The
business purpose merely pertains, as implied above, to whether the
business organization is for or not-for-profit, or less conservatively,
to whom surpluses are distributed (to shareholders or for social
mission). 117
The decision is interesting on another level because it shows
that Hong Kong does not welcome the combination of a make money
and do good approach. Indeed, the court applied quasi-Unrelated In-
108 Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners v Pemsel [18911 A.C. 531 (H.L.)
583.
109 CHARITIES SUBCOMM., supra note 12, at ch. 2.4-2.7, 3.5, 3.7, 5.5.
110 Church Body of the Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui v. Comm'r of Inland Revenue,
[2009] 3 H.C.I.A.
111 Hong Kong Shen Kung Hui Found. Ordinance, (1999) Cap. 1157, § 4 (H.K.).
112 Id. at Cap. 1159 § 4 (H.K.).
113 See PATRICK CHEUNG & PATRICE MARCEAU, A.B.A., FOREIGN LAWYERS FORUM,
NAT'L REPORT HONG KONG 2010 16-17.
114 See id.
115 See id.
116 See id.
117 See id.
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come Business Tax1"' ("UBIT") commerciality doctrine, holding that
charitable organizations engaging in commercial activities can risk
their special status if their business activities become too large in rela-
tion to their charitable activities."' This is, in fact, nothing more than
a selective taxation by which charitable organizations are discouraged
from engaging in large and profitable business. 120 Malani and Posner,
amongst others, have also emphasized that the purpose of UBIT is to
deprive not-for-profit organizations of tax advantages when they com-
pete against for-profit firms in commercial markets. 12 1 Clearly, con-
cerns about the general protection of a tax base drove the adoption of
this tax. 122 These arguments may as well serve as the actual rationale
in Sheng Kung Hui.
The narrowness of either the for-profit or not-for-profit system
has another problem which is usually referred to as the wealth max-
imization paradigm or Revlon Rule. Admittedly, this is not yet of rele-
vance for Hong Kong. However, with the social venture sector now
rapidly growing in Hong Kong, this problem could occur. Since Hong
Kong lacks relevant case law, we will illustrate the problem with one
story particularly exploited in American literature. In 1919, Ford Mo-
tor Company chaired by Henry Ford lost a court case against the
Dodge brothers, the latter being minority shareholders and opposed to
cutting T-model prices at the expense of decreasing dividends.1 2 3 In
contemporary terms, one could call Henry Ford a model social entre-
preneur generating good and addressing social needs via the creation
of affordable cars. His mission was hampered, however, by the Michi-
gan Supreme Court ruling that Mr. Ford owed a duty to the sharehold-
ers to maximize the business organization's profits rather than to
generate benefits for the community or the employees. 1 24 The Su-
preme Court of Delaware later repeated this ruling in Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. when it stated that the rule that
during an unavoidable sale or winding up of a business organization,
the shareholders of the purchased entity shall receive the best price
available for their shares. 125 The U.S. legislation took this aspect into
118 I.R.S. Pub. 598 (March 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p598.
pdf.
119 James Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 Wm &
MARY L. REV. 487, 491 (2002).
120 Corporate Creativity, supra note 14, at 79, 82; see also Reiser, supra note 16, at
6.
121 Malani & Posner, supra note 17, at 2026-27.
122 Id.
123 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
124 See id.
125 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986). For an interpretation of Revlon, see Plerhoples, supra note 22, at 243-47.
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consideration when it adopted special legal entities for dual purpose
businesses, which thereby made wealth maximization claims against
directors obsolete. 126 We, however, do not advance this direction for
Hong Kong as we prefer a more flexible system than one which offers a
variety of different legal vehicles and thereby even further complicates
the status quo.12 7
This whole confusion surrounding charitable objects and chari-
table purposes eventually triggered the question of whether it would
not be more appropriate to base the charitable status on charitable
purpose instead of charitable objects. 12 s This, as suggested, would give
charities more independence when choosing the most effective charita-
ble activities and thereby allow them to achieve the charitable objects
in the most flexible and innovative ways.' 29 If the criterion is the so-
cial activity pursued by the business organization, the business of our
hypothetical social venture would certainly not be regarded as a social
activity. Is selling shoes a social activity at first glance? The criterion
of objects would lead us into an endless discussion around different
valuations which, ultimately, would not even improve the current situ-
ation. Consequently, we suggest a different approach.
Our proposal is the following: first, the bipolarity of for-profit
and not-for-profit business purpose must be abandoned and social ven-
tures as a blended form of for-profit and not-for-profit approach must
be added. This will permit social ventures to pursue their business
with a dual approach and at the same time allow profits to be partially
distributed to the investors and partially reinvested into their social
mission. In the case of our hypothetical social venture, it would need to
be stated that the business organization aims to relieve poverty in poor
countries by distributing shoes for free and also at profits from selling
shoes in rich countries which will be partially distributed to the inves-
tors and partially used for their social mission. This would then need
to be further refined in the charitable objects. As to the social purpose
of social ventures, it must comply with the charitable purposes offered
by the charity law. This will help to streamline the registration of so-
cial ventures as suggested below and will contribute to a better charac-
terization of doing good.1 30
126 Plerhoples, supra note 22, at 243.
127 Id.
128 CHARITIES SUBCOMM., supra note 12, at ch. 5.49, 56.
129 See id. at 109 (revealing some incoherence) ("A registered charitable organiza-
tion should be required to file annually an activity report stating any change of
charitable objects and the main activities carried out to fulfill the charitable
objects.").
130 See id. at 24.
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2.4. Conclusion
We initiated this section by addressing the ambiguous ap-
proach to social ventures by the authorities in Hong Kong. Explana-
tions put forward by the Legislative Council and the former Chief
Executive Officer are too unspecific, and it is unclear what objects
qualify for a social mission. They also show that social ventures are
incorrectly being equated with not-for-profit companies. We moved on
to tackle the question of the appropriate legal vehicle for social ven-
tures and examined that social ventures in Hong Kong may either in-
corporate as a for-profit or not-for-profit business organization but
both options are not ideal and result in a legal dilemma. We then
briefly introduced the option of combining a for-profit and not-for-
profit business organization by means of contractual arrangements.
Specific legal entities, such as the low-profit limited liability company,
were next introduced to give an example on the approach taken by the
U.S. legislature. In the last section we scrutinized how doing good is
being conceived by the legislator and show that Hong Kong has built
up barriers for social ventures as exemplified in the landmark case of
Church Body of The Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui v. Commissioner of
Inland Revenue (2009). We finished this section by calling for a more
straightforward system under which the bipolarity of the company law
would be abandoned.
3. DECOUPLING COUPLED PRIVILEGES
The deficiencies of an unfriendly regulatory environment for
social ventures in Hong Kong are not limited to the lack of appropriate
business vehicles meeting their needs, as discussed in the previous
section. These extend to all other areas of law under which traditional
not-for-profit organizations are credited for doing good and under
which social ventures are not, leaving the latter at a grave disadvan-
tage. The only option we see of how to cure the situation is to decouple
privileges by means of complex reform, the basic assumption of which
we put forth in this section.
We start this section by identifying areas in which such bene-
fits have been granted and move to a step-by-step analysis of how the
granting of these benefits could better correspond with actual needs of
both commercial charities and social ventures without penalizing so-
cial ventures for their for-profit legal status.
3.1. Bunch of Privileges?
From the discussion so far, one might infer that the lost income
tax exemption of social ventures compared with officially recognized
not-for-profit charities enjoying this privilege is, apart from lack of an
appropriate legal vehicle, the only further injustice that social ven-
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tures meet. This problem is, however, not limited to income tax breaks,
and charities registered in Hong Kong enjoy many further privileges
from which social ventures are barred. In this subsection, we identify
three such areas of privileges.
First, Hong Kong offers tax deductions on donations to offi-
cially recognized Section 88 charities up to thirty-five per cent of either
assessable profits of legal entities or individuals carrying on a trade,
profession, or business,13 1 or thirty-five per cent of assessable income
of income of individuals.1 3 2 In 2008-09, this amounted to HK$8.04 bil-
lion in total.13 3 Obviously, no donations to for-profit social ventures
qualify for the privilege of tax deductions. As a result, potential donors
are simply discouraged from making any donations to social ventures
because they cannot deduct what they would pay in.
Second, social ventures are also disadvantaged in raising funds
in public places."' Under the Summary Offences Ordinance, any per-
son collecting money or organizing a charitable sale in a public place
for a charitable purpose must first apply for a public subscription per-
mit from the Social Welfare Department. 3 5 This permit covers two
kinds of actions: flag days and general charitable fundraising.
1 3 6
While flag days can only be organized by Section 88 entities, general
charitable fundraising can be, in theory, operated by entities without
charitable status.1 3 7 Such status, however, might be taken into consid-
eration during the review of application for public subscription per-
mit.1 3 Finally, any organization could apply for non-charitable fund
raising authorization from the Home Affairs Bureau, which is mostly
131 See Inland Revenue Ordinance, (2012) Cap. 112, 40, §16D(2)(d) (H.K.); see also
CHARITIES SUBCOMM., supra note 12, at 143.
132 See Inland Revenue Ordinance, (2012) Cap. 112, 87, § 26C(2A)(c); see also
CHARITIES SUBCOMM., supra note 12, at 143.
133 See CHARITIES SUBCOMM., supra note 12, at 143.
134 Summary Offenses Ordinance, (2012) Cap. 228, 1, § 2(l) (H.K.) (defining "pub-
lic place" as: "all piers, thoroughfares, streets, roads, lanes, alleys, courts, squares,
archways, waterways, passages, paths, ways and places to which the public have
access either continuously or periodically, whether the same are the property of
the Government or of private persons.").
135 See id. at 3, § 4(17)(i) (H.K.); see also CHARITIES SUBCOMM., supra note 12, at
120.
136 See generally Gov't of H.K. Special Admin. Region, Social Welfare Dep't, Con-
ditions of Public Subscription Permit for Holding Territory-wide Flag Days in
2012-13 (2011) (Flag days are a traditional form of occasional charitable fundrais-
ing in Hong Kong. Applications are filed in September, considered in October and
days are finally allocated in November for the consecutive year).
137 See Gov't of H.K. Special Admin. Region, Social Welfare Dep't, Public Sub-
scription Permit Application Form and Explanatory Notes on Application for Pub-
lic Subscription Permit (revised May 2012).
138 Id.
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used by political organizations."3 9 But in such a case, the public fun-
draising could not be advertised as being for a charitable purpose.
Therefore, public fundraising is also an activity in respect to which
social ventures have difficulties with fulfilling the respective
requirements.
Coupling in the case of flag days is particularly strict. While we
will refer in the following subsections to establishing multi-entity or-
ganizations comprising of both a for-profit and not-for-profit entities as
a tool to circumvent coupling, such hybrid structures could be pretty
useless in the case of flag days. The Social Welfare Department, for
example, arbitrarily considers applications from charitable organiza-
tions, which are associated with commercial organizations to be ineli-
gible for this kind of fundraising."4 °
Third, recognized charities have also been offered an exemp-
tion from the obligation to register under the Business Registration
Ordinance even though they conduct business operations.14 2 This
is, in our opinion, a rather thorny distortion of reality because com-
mercial charities are, to some extent, usual business organizations.
These entities also compete with social ventures, yet get unjustifiably
preferential governmental treatment. As we have emphasized, com-
mercial charities, like social ventures, are business organizations
which use business methods. The distinction lies in the fact that the
latter has a more entrepreneurial spirit, and entrepreneurship in ser-
vice of others should be affirmed rather than camouflaged.
As a word of caution, we want to mention a proposal to couple
privileges in the area of government procurement that was discussed
in the Legislative Council but fortunately has not been adopted.
Namely, the Legislative Council considered reserving a certain per-
centage of the procurement of government goods and services for social
ventures in order to provide room for their development. 143 If the pro-
posal had been adopted then, again, the status or the form of an organ-
ization would be rewarded rather than how much good the
organization actually generated. 144
139 See Summary Offenses Ordinance, (2012) Cap. 228, 3, § 4(17)(ii) (H.K.); see
also CHARITIES SUBCOMM., supra note 12, at 120-22.
140 See Flag Days, Social Welfare Dep't, www.swd.gov.hk/doc/Control-of-Char/
FD%20eligibility%20criteria%2020110401e.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
141 Business Registration Ordinance, (1997), Cap 310. (H.K.).
142 Id.
143 Official Record of Proceedings, supra note 1, at 8444-8445; PANEL OF WELFARE
SERvs., supra note 9, at pt. 5.1 (f), 26.
144 Not to mention potential non-compliance with WTO Government Procurement
Agreement (GPA) to which Hong Kong has been a member party since 1997, if the
value of the contracts were in excess of SDR 130,000 (USD 190,000-200,00)).
Above that threshold, Hong Kong's public procurers are obliged to offer national
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3.2. Fetish of Profits Tax
The profits tax seems to be the leitmotif and a kind of fetish in
the discussion on commercial charities and social ventures elsewhere,
and we also have not escaped this narrative in our argument. How-
ever, before making new propositions or applauding old ones, we
should first consider whether income tax breaks and tax exemptions
are the right approach at all. There are some doubts that need to be
discussed.
First, profits tax breaks work like subsidies.14 5 Subsidies are
not a rare phenomenon, but governments support specific activities of
businesses in line with governmental policies regardless of their status
or legal form.14 That is not the case of general privileges offered to
charities where just the status is credited. In effectu, general privileges
allow unfair competition towards entities which do not enjoy these tax
breaks; therefore these privileges must be conceptually queried.'
4 7
Subsidies in the form of general profits tax could drive predatory pric-
ing when a commercial charity sells products at lower prices than com-
petitors and thereby drives them out of the market. This can be
illustrated with a very efficient commercial charity generating a lot of
blended value. It cannot distribute its surpluses as profits to share-
holders and therefore spends surpluses on undercutting prices.' 48
Second, profits tax breaks are not fair toward taxpayers. For
example, Oleck in the early 1970s described tax breaks for some chari-
ties as a kind of unjust burden that generally encumbers all taxpay-
ers,14 9 and doubted whether granting tax breaks to churches, for
instance, is fair to believers of other religions, not to mention agnostics
or atheists. 15 0 Nowadays, we could ask whether it is fair to subsidize
organizations at the expense of the miser that might pay less in taxes
if the overall scale of subsidies via tax breaks was reduced. Only pro-
vocatively could we further ask whether it is fair to subsidize organiza-
tions taking care of animal welfare while there are some taxpayers
absolutely indifferent to the well-being of animals, or even more pro-
treatment to suppliers of the other GPA parties and therefore preferences for do-
mestic section 88 organizations would be a violation of this obligation.
145 Malani & Posner, supra note 17, at 93.
146 Id.; see also Vulgar Charity, supra note 14, at 2463.
147 Howard L. Oleck, Proprietary Mentality and the New Non-Profit Corporation
Laws, CLEV. ST. L. REV. 20 (1971) 154; Reiser, supra note 16, at 7.
148 I.R.S. Pub. 598 (March 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p598.
pdf; Vulgar Charity, supra note 14, at 2463-64 (arguing that there was absolutely
no evidence that these phenomena occurred because commercial charities use tax
break premiums to subsidize their social mission than to subsidize predatory
pricing).
149 Oleck, supra note 147, at 154.
150 Id.
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vocatively whether some antidemocratic taxpayers like the idea of sub-
sidies to organizations advancing citizenship. This per se futile
discussion illustrates some difficulties that governments face when de-
termining taxpayers' preferences. Such dilemmas result in encourag-
ing taxpayers to support specific social actions of the private sector
pursuant to the choices made by governments instead of the taxpayers
themselves and that are often contrary to the views of some. 15 ' With-
out diving into this discussion, encouraging non-governmental charity
by granting general tax breaks does not seem the right tool, for it par-
tially contravenes the very idea of private charity which should be far
from governmental influences.
Third, for some authors, tax erosion and tax loss resulting from
tax breaks is a grave problem." 2 We, however, believe that the essen-
tial question is whether good generated on the basis of tax breaks
would otherwise be generated by means of direct public spending. This
problem seems to be already partially addressed in Hong Kong, as
charitable expenditures of tax exempted organizations are to be sub-
stantially expended in Hong Kong.'1 3 Because of this constraint, such
expenditures are more likely to be made for the purposes of which,
even in their absence, the government would spend money anyway. To
the extent they do, they could off-set any tax loss. Finally, some try to
defend income tax breaks by observing that commercial charities are
unable to raise capital. This is correct as to the equity market but capi-
tal can still be raised over the debts market.15 4
All in all, it is apparent that there is no good cause for offering
or maintaining profits tax exemption for charitable organizations. Ad-
mittedly, tax advantages crediting legal status might not be particu-
larly detrimental to the competition in markets, where both exempt
and non-exempt entities operate because commercial charities might
not be cost-efficient enough to take advantage of these benefits. Even
so, commercial charities might not be cost-efficient enough, because
they are dispirited by tax advantages, which constructs a vicious cir-
cle. Therefore, a general profits tax exemption might result in stifling
innovation in the charitable landscape. As such, the legitimacy of
these exemptions is highly questionable.
That is not to say, however, that exempted business organiza-
tions should be simply deprived of their tax advantages and left alone
without being offered quid pro quo or other forms of support. In the
next subsections we attempt to sketch an alternative system based on
an approach of decoupling deductions, donations, constraining non-
151 Id.
152 See id.; Columbo, supra note 119, at 532-34.
153 See Inland Revenue Ordinance, (2012) Cap. 112, 154, § 88 (H.K.).
154 Malani & Posner, supra note 17, at 2040.
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distribution, and the registration of mission-driven business organiza-
tion. This will show that our proposal is more straightforward and
highlights the need for a reconsideration of the current system.
3.3. Limited Deductibility of Social Expenditures
A deductibility of expenditure incurred by social ventures in
relation to its social mission poses a much more important role than
profits tax exemption. Suppose all expenditures are deductible, social
ventures can easily circumvent the lack of profits tax exemption while
commercial charities do not need one at all. Namely, surpluses can be
reinvested on a continuous basis resulting in a surplus at the end of
the accounting period with a cost of close or equal to zero. There is no
taxable profit and profits tax breaks would therefore be immaterial.1 55
There are two counterarguments against such a claim. First, it
is not the purpose of social ventures to reach break-even point and
they need to make money, at least in the long term. We will address
this problem later on where we propose flexible non-distribution
constraint. 156
Second, not all expenditures that social ventures make (or that
commercial charities would have to make if they were deprived of prof-
its tax exemption) are deductible, and therefore, for the time being, do
not constitute an actual alternative for profits tax exemption. As a
matter of fact, a business organization based in Hong Kong can deduct
all outgoings and expenses from assessable income, other than ex-
penses of a domestic or private nature and capital expenditure, wholly,
exclusively, and necessarily incurred in the production of the assessa-
ble income. 157 By way of reminder, legal entities can deduct charitable
expenses even up to thirty-five per cent of their assessable profits/in-
come but only in the form of donations sensu stricto under Section
88.158 Theoretically, this might imply that organizations not exempted
under Section 88 should not do good at all. We consider to what extent
this is an issue in practice in the following paragraphs.
Business organizations with social missions that generate per-
fect blended value do not need to deduct costs of social missions be-
cause there are no costs at all. They do not bear any costs of social
missions as only ordinary expenses are being incurred in the course of
business operations. In such cases, there may remain a surplus which
would typically be taxable as profit, and there is no good reason why it
should be tax-exempt. This preliminary remark implies that tax
breaks are irrelevant for social ventures which generate good at no
151 Id. at 2043.
156 See infra, Section 3.4.
157 Inland Revenue Ordinance, (2010) Cap. 112, 30, § 16(1) (H.K.).
158 Id. at § 16D.
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cost; but a contrario they are relevant for social ventures which gener-
ate good at a cost. They are also relevant for business organizations
which only create little blended value and at the same time buy good
as is typical for organizations such as corporate philanthropies.
Suppose next that social ventures do not generate perfect
blended value and need to devote some portion of means to produce
good that otherwise would increase profit. In practice, tax authorities,
of course, would not question expenses like higher wages for blue-col-
lar workers than would normally be offered on the market. Likewise,
authorities are not likely to interfere with zero margins on the sale of
shoes in poor communities, or to refugees coming to Hong Kong by say-
ing that the low margin is de facto a donation either.
However, the hypothetical social venture is walking on thin ice
when it begins to offer shoes for free or almost for free and does not do
so in conspiracy because it needs to address its offer to those in need
publicly. In that case, expenses attributable to these particular items
are not incurred in the production of the assessable income and should
not be deducted. Put otherwise, only expenses incurred with a view to
make profit are deductible while gratuitous transfers are not.15 9 It is
also a clear position of the Hong Kong Inland Revenue Department
that expenditures should be properly apportioned, so that separate
parts of expenditures are allotted to making profits, and other parts
are devoted to some other ends, such as offering them for free. 160 If
expenses are incurred for dual purposes, they should be fairly allo-
cated on a proportionate basis.1 6 1 In essence, charitable expenses of
for-profit organizations should therefore not compensate surpluses
generated by for-profit business operations. Put otherwise, the sur-
pluses generated by for-profit business operations should first be taxed
before net profits can be paid out. This approach is pragmatic,
straightforward, and also in line with Sheng Kung Hui v IRD.16 2
Suppose then that social expenditures are nondeductible,
whereupon our social venture decides to set up a spin-off Section 88
organization to allow operation as a hybrid of two entities, one being
for-profit and one not-for-profit. Such structure would allow the ven-
ture to allocate surplus devoted to donations in the tax-exempt charity
and to leave the remaining portion in the for-profit vehicle with a view
159 Id.
160 INLAND REVENUE DEP'T, PROFITS TAx APPORTIONMENT OF EXPENSES, DEPART-
MENTAL INTERPRETAITON AND PRAc. NOTES No. 3 (REVISED) 3 (2008).
161 Id. at 4-5.
162 Church Body of the Hong Kong Sheng Hung HUi v. Comm'r of Inland Reve-
nue, HCIA 2/2009 (C.F.I. Jan. 27, 2010) (Legal Reference System) (H.K.); see also
Malani & Posner, supra note 17, at 2025 (observing legal entity as being
irrelevant).
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to pay it out as profits. Taxable income would be only the latter. None-
theless, further problems would appear.
First, donations to charitable organizations in Hong Kong can
only be made in money and not in kind.16 3 This has the rather unusual
result that our hypothetical social venture would have to donate
money to its subsidiary so that the former can sell shoes to the latter,
instead of donating the shoes directly. Here the legislator, with all
force and without good cause, prefers buying good to generating good
and makes futile attempts to preserve the world of business organiza-
tions that are, at most, involved in corporate philanthropy by making
money transfers to traditional charities.
Second, the ceiling of allowed deductible donations to Section
88 organizations set at thirty-five per cent imposes star ratios for do-
ing good and prevents the more ambitious efforts that social ventures
may have. If social ventures intended to allocate twice as much of the
surplus to doing good than to making money (about 66.6 per cent
against 33.3 per cent), it could only deduct the maximum approved
limit of thirty-five per cent. 164 As a result, the hypothetical organiza-
tion would assign less for its mission, reconsider the donation, or be
pushed into sham transactions between the two entities constituting
the hybrid. Hong Kong apparently prefers business organizations rein-
vesting one-third of their surpluses in their social missions to organi-
zations with a more eager approach.
Yet more problems would emerge if new markets were created
to meet social needs outside Hong Kong, where shoes are offered at
symbolic prices. Establishing related foreign for-profit subsidiaries
would not work in this case because they might immediately raise eye-
brows as to transfer prices among related business organizations and
result in income adjustment. 165 Two-entity hybrids would not work ei-
ther because the one that is a charity still must be based in Hong Kong
and spend a significant portion of its funds in Hong Kong. 166
The poor deductibility of charitable expenditures bolsters the
monopoly of donative and commercial charities instead of facilitating
the operation of social ventures. While social ventures using a for-
profit vehicle need to be attentive to how to lawfully deduct their social
163 INLAND REVENUE DEP'T, CONCESSIONARY DEDUCTIONS: SECTION 26C APPROVED
CHARITABLE DONATIONS, DEPARTMENTAL INTERPRETATION AND PRAC. NOTES No. 37
(REVISED) 5 (2006).
164 Charitable Donations and Tax-Exempt Charities, INLAND REVENUE DEPART-
MENT (H.K.) (June 28, 2013) http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/tax/ach.htm.
165 See generally INLAND REVENUE DEP'T, TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES;
METHODOLIGIES AND RELATED ISSUES, DEPARTMENTAL INTERPRETATION AND PRAC-
TICE NOTES No. 46 (2009).
166 See Inland Revenue Ordinance, (2012) Cap. 112, 154, § 88 (H.K.).
34 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:1
expenses, exempted non-profit commercial charities do not need to at
all. Therefore, the deductibility of expenses in the present form is not
an appropriate substitute for income exemption.
Therefore, we propose that all business organizations with an
approved social mission can deduct socially-oriented transfers,
whether pecuniary or in kind. Third party donors can deduct their
charitable transfers to such business organizations. Deductions by so-
cial ventures would then-using the language of the Inland Revenue
Ordinance-consist of all outgoings and expenses, other than expenses
of a domestic or private nature and capital expenditure, wholly, exclu-
sively, and necessarily incurred in the production of the assessable in-
come as well as all outgoings and expenses incurred in pursuance of
their approved social mission. However, this requires amendments to
the system of (i) deductibility of donations, (ii) no-distribution con-
straints, and (iii) registration/supervision. The details of this proposal
are presented below.
3.4. Decoupling Donations
Section 88 should not be restricted to not-for-profit organiza-
tions and donations sensu stricto. It needs to be more responsive to the
needs of commercial charities and social ventures (if the latter were
granted with the right to receive deductible donations) because both
typically rely on price premiums that donors currently cannot deduct.
Therefore, deductible donations made by third party donors could also
be price premiums that donors agree to pay over the market price for
the shoes because of their social mission. The latter would require,
however, that business organizations are allowed to apportion the
amount between market price and effectively paid price.
Currently, if a donor receives any benefit, such as a pair of
shoes, in exchange for any portion of the total payment, then nothing
can be deducted from the donor's assessable income in Hong Kong. The
exception would be charitable sales whereby badges, flags, tokens, etc.
are not of material consideration but merely the acknowledgements of
donations. 16 7 But they are still regarded as donations as they are with-
out any material consideration. 16 The reason for Hong Kong's firm
position is that the whole transfer has to be donative and no apportion-
167 Payments for gave spaces, purchases of raffle tickets, admission fees to charity
film shows, and the cost of tickets for charity balls and concerts, etc. See INLAND
REVENUE DEP'T, CONCESSIONARY DEDUCTIONS SECTION 26C APPROVED CHARITABLE
DONATIONS, DEPARTMENTAL INTERPRETATION AND PRAc. NOTES, No. 37 (REVISED) T
4 (2006).
168 Id. at T 3.
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ment between commercial and charitable components of the price is
possible. 169
Consequently, decoupling of fundraising privileges and appor-
tionment would need to be allowed. As shown by the American exam-
ple of Malani and Posner, transfers made up of components paid for
material consideration and as gifts proved to be divisible in the sense
that issuing separate bills for commercial considerations and receipts
of charitable payments is feasible in practice. 170 Our hypothetical so-
cial venture would then simply offer two receipts, one for the donation
which is also usable for the tax deduction and one for the product it-
self. Of course, de minimis value thresholds are usually applicable and
this would be set at HK$100 in Hong Kong, below which no donation
can be deducted by donors for practical reasons.
3.5. Exempted Income
Now that we have addressed how the system of deductible do-
nations should be structured, we now make the claim that only income
received as approved charitable donations should be tax exempt, 17 1
and that no organization should be generally exempted, regardless of
its social mission, of its for or not-for-profit status, and even regardless
of whether it operates as a business or not. Purely donative charities
would maintain their status quo as their revenue would be generated
from exempted income only. All business organizations with social
missions, however, would, in principle, pay profits tax on their busi-
ness operations. It might seem controversial whether social ventures
and commercial charities should pay taxes equally but we believe that
the answer is yes for at least two reasons.
First, commercial charities now pay profits taxes imposed in a
chaotic way. As mentioned, this problem has been approached with so-
called commerciality taxes imposed either via statutory arrangements
like UBIT in U.S. legislation or de facto via judicial decisions in Hong
Kong. "'7 2 Needless to say, this is detrimental to practical business
needs and results in incidental and unpredictable tax-kicking based on
unclear rules.
Second, as we have already proposed, business organizations
doing good would also be able to deduct even gratuitous transfers
made in pursuance of their social mission as well as to apportion chari-
table premiums to be excluded from their assessable business income.
As a result, these organizations would only pay taxes on surpluses
169 Id.
170 Malani & Posner, supra note 17, at 2063.
171 This also includes other types of specific contributions to other non-charitable
or for profit organizations, like contributions to political parties.
172 See Vulgar Charity, supra note 14, at 2439.
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which they want to accumulate or pay out, rather than to reinvest
those in their social mission. Thus, commercial charities would be en-
couraged to spend more on their social missions-that is how
decoupling of privileges in practice should be understood.
The merit of our proposal is that tax law is one of high complex-
ity and that our approach does not further complicate this system. We
already live in a reality where various types of revenues are included
or excluded from assessable profits of businesses. For instance, dam-
ages received from third parties would constitute business income for
the purposes of income tax assessment if these compensate for lost
profits (lucrum cessans), but not if these damages compensate for ac-
tual loss (damnum emergens). In addition, very often the total amount
of compensation must be properly apportioned between these two cate-
gories. Classification of expenses is even more complicated with some
expenses being deductible at once, some subject to amortization, de-
preciation, or some not deductible until particular assets are resold
(especially securities). Further, some revenue and expenses for income
tax purposes are booked on either cash or accrual basis. This is to say
that bookkeeping for tax purposes has always been complicated, and,
against this background, our proposal is straightforward.
3.6. Flexible Non-Distribution Constraint
Social entrepreneurs cannot benefit personally from the sup-
port they receive from the public. In the case of commercial charities,
this has been approached very rigidly with an absolute non-distribu-
tion constraint and not-for-profit status. We, however, see a much
more flexible solution that abandons this bipolar thinking. Why do we
not consider a mechanism whereby any limitations on payment of
profit are strictly related to the amount of support received in the form
of officially recognized deductible donations? Put otherwise, we make
the proposition that surplus minus donations can be distributed to
stakeholders.
How would it work in practice? Let us first confine the analy-
sis to premiums, keeping in mind that donations sensu stricto still
need to be addressed below. Suppose it costs 12 monetary units on av-
erage to produce one pair of shoes and the market price in Hong Kong
that affluent clients can afford is 18 without any charitable price pre-
mium (18 is the market price). The surplus generated on the commer-
cial sales of one pair is then 6. So, if the social venture gives one pair of
shoes for free in poor communities per each two sold to affluent clients,
it can reach break-even point. But, if it gives for free one per three
items sold, it earns two monetary units on each pair of shoes sold and
can distribute the profits accordingly. In turn, if it tried to attract price
premiums, say 6 monetary units per a pair of shoes and the total price
were 24, it could generate reasonable surpluses on each item regard-
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less whether it gave one for free per two or three pairs of shoes (sur-
plus per sold pair respectively 6 and 8). Under the current system,
however, the social venture still could not pay out any money because
the non-distribution constraint would reflect the amount of accepted
deductible donations if it gave one pair of shoes per each two sold (sur-
plus and non-distribution constraint both being 6 per sold pair would
mutually cancel against each other). If it gave one pair of shoes per
each three sold, it could pay out profit being 2 per each sold pair but it
could face criticism of carrying out too limited a dimension of doing
good.
What a clever social entrepreneur might consider doing is to
sell a single pair of shoes at the same price of 24 but report more on
the commercial receipt (19 instead of 18) and less on the charitable one
(5 instead of 6), which is possible in the case of affluent clients
purchasing in the general ambit of doing good. That is the only way in
this model that the social venture can "employ" two and not three
pairs of shoes sold to work for one handed out for free, and still be
profitable. It also appears that this solution may generally prevent po-
tential attempts to deduct commercial transfers from purchasers as
charitable ones, as the more transfers the social ventures would accept
as charitable the less it could pay out as profits.
This system would also improve efficiencies of commercial
charities. Since a commercial charity only aims at reaching break-even
point, if it does the same job as our hypothetical social venture, it is as
efficient with a production cost equal to 12. Thus, it could offer both
lower total prices and show higher numbers on charitable receipts and,
as a result, would probably outnumber any social venture in the sale of
shoes. This shows that efficient commercial charities, if such existed,
could benefit even more than social ventures from apportionment and
flexible non-distribution constraint as a part of a decoupling package.
To sum up, we make the claim that our proposal on taxation
and on distribution constraint has no loopholes. In particular, a kind of
bookkeeping reserve equating to the amount of total received approved
donations would accrue over the years but it could now grow endlessly.
So, it should be further analyzed how quickly this reserve should be
amortized, as otherwise, no profits could be paid out after some time
(although this is more of an accountancy issue). We believe that the
proposed system does not leave more space for scams and abuses in
terms of tax incentives offered to charitable organizations than the
current system, designed only for not-for-profit organizations, does.
3.7. Registration
The proposed system of substantive corporate and tax solution
needs to work in tandem with a new registration system that em-
braces all organizations doing good. It is necessary that social mission
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objectives are first pre-assessed for taxation and consumer protection
reasons. Then, any pre-assessed organization could flexibly, from time
to time or at random, do good and take advantage of the substantive
solutions that we have offered. The question is how to fit these postu-
lates under the current system of charities registration in Hong Kong.
Currently, a not-for-profit organization seeking tax exemption
under Section 88 must apply for the recognition of the Commissioner
of Inland Revenue Department. 1 73 It must attach a number of docu-
ments supporting the argument that it has been established merely for
a charitable purposes and for the public benefit. These documents in-
clude memoranda and articles of associations of the business organiza-
tion, constitution of association, deed of trust (or respective drafts if
not yet established), a list of planned activities for the upcoming 12
months, and, if applicable, such a list for the preceding 12 months as
well as accounts for the last financial year. 174 Once an organization is
approved as charitable within the meaning of Section 88, its status
may be verified on the basis of accounts or annual reports.'7 5
In practice, this system of recognition has proved to be discre-
tionary in the sense that the IRD had full discretion in approving the
application and no opportunity to file a claim against a rejected appli-
cation is available. Similarly, the only existing ad hoc review criteria
have been enclosed in non-binding and rather simplistic "best practice
guidelines" prepared by the Corruption Prevention Department. 176
There is no single piece of legislation specifically governing all differ-
ent charitable organizations. 177 During the discussions on the charity
law reform, it was aptly emphasized that the current system only em-
braces organizations which seek tax exemption under Section 88.178
Other institutions, such as Chinese Temples,' 7 9 Chinese Permanent
Cemeteries,18 0 schools, 8 1 hospitals, 1 2 numerous statutorily estab-
lished entities,8 3 and a category of non-governmental organizations
173 Inland Revenue Ordinance, (2012) Cap. 112, 154, § 88 (H.K.).
174 Id.
175 A Tax Guide for Charitable Institutions and Trusts of a Public Character, IN-
LAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT (H.K.) (June 28, 2013) http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/tax/
achtgc.htm.
176 ICAC CORRUPTION PREVENTION DEP'T, BEST PRACTICE CHECKLIST - GOVERN-
ANCE AND INTERNAL CONTROL IN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 6, available
at http://www.icac.org.hk/filemanager/en/content 1031/ngo-e.pdf.
177 CHARITIES SuBCOMM., supra note 12, at 103, 8.3.
178 Id. at 98-99.
179 Register kept by The Social Welfare Department. Id. at 92.
180 Register kept by The Home Affairs Bureau. Id. at 93.
181 Register kept by The Education Bureau. Id. at 94.
182 Register kept by The Hospital Authority. Id.
183 CHARITIES SuBCOMM., supra note 12, at 94.
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receiving public subsidies'1 4 are regulated under specific statutes and
exempted from Section 88.185 Some rules are contained in the Compa-
nies Ordinances, under which most of the Section 88 organizations
have been established, requiring disclosure and regular filings of fi-
nancial accounts to the Companies Registry."8 6 The same require-
ments apply to associations' 8 7 and charitable trusts.18 8 Together, this
shows several regulatory overlaps.
To our great surprise, some serious voices in the discussion on
reform have asked for a uniform approach to the registration of chari-
ties,'8 9 which would mean the introduction of a special vehicle to re-
place the existing panoply. 190 Even though the idea of a uniform
approach remains an open question, the undertone of the Consultation
Paper ran against it.' 9 ' While we make a dauntless proposal on
decoupling, which offers much more flexibility to for-profit and not-for-
profit organizations, we firmly disagree with that idea because we dis-
agree with special inflexible vehicles meant to accommodate social
ventures.
What has been proposed to address registration issues, as a
highlight of the reform, is to establish, as far as possible, a "one-stop"
authority, a centralized charities commission performing functions
currently ascribed to various bodies.' 9 2 This body would be responsible
not only for registration and monitoring of charitable organizations
and keeping the public register,' 9 3 but also for granting all permits
related to public fundraising.' 9 4 The future centralized authority
would register only not-for-profit organizations seeking donations in
public places while organizations not engaged in such fundraising ac-
tivity would not be subject to registration.1 5
Again to our great surprise, it has been almost conclusively-
proposed that powers to grant tax exemption under Section 88 of the
IRO should remain with the IRD. Any organization would first need to
apply for general recognition as a charitable organization to the pro-
posed body and then apply, if it were interested, to the IRD for income
184 Register kept by The Home Affairs Bureau. Id. at 93-94.
185 See generally id. at 92-94.
186 Id. at 92.
187 Id. at 92-93.
188 Id. at 93.
189 CHARITIES SuBCOMM., supra note 12, at 90.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 99, 188-67.
193 Id. at 172.
194 Id.
195 CHARTIES SUBCOMM, supra note 12, at 98-99.
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tax exemption.196 In fact, the commission suggests a complicated two-
stage approval system with necessary approval of two governmental
departments, one of the IRD and another of the proposed centralized
body. This two-stage approval system leaves essential questions unan-
swered. First, the role of the IRD in this system is unclear if the pro-
posed body were the one to decide the charitable status of the
applicant. Second, it is also unclear which department makes an or-
ganization eligible to receive deductible donations from donors. If the
final approval of the IRD grants the applicant the opportunity to issue
tax deduction receipts, the approval of the proposed centralized body
would only be pro forma without any material effect. Consequentially,
any donations received before the approval of the IRD would not be
deductible. If, in turn, the right to receive deductible donations had
already been granted with the approval of the proposed centralized
body, the applying entity would then pay taxes on already approved
and deductible charitable donations (if it did not separately apply for a
Section 88 exemption), which can hardly be a serious proposition. As
proposed, this two-step approval system has some flaws which need to
be corrected. We suggest a more convenient and realistic multi-stage
registration, but still a truly one-stop system, which, beside charities,
also takes social ventures into account.
This multi-stage registration system is based on the proposi-
tion, as elaborated above, that general income, which also includes
charitable donations, is exempted from taxes. Profits generated on
business activities are still included, but all charitable expenses are
deductible. Under this registration system, a social venture could first
apply for recognition of its charitable goals, then apply to be allowed to
deduct gratuitous transfers linked to these charitable goals and op-
tionally apply to be allowed to receive deductible donations. In con-
trast, a donative charity which typically relies on donations would
apply for all privileges at one time.
Under this system, application for recognition of charitable
goals may not be deemed necessary, as it is not linked with some direct
privileges. The mere recognition of mission is, however, very impor-
tant in the context of branding and labeling. Malani and Posner, and
separately Hansmann, observed that when donors cannot properly as-
sess the actual quality of mission pursued by a given charitable organ-
ization due to information asymmetries, the not-for-profit form of an
organization is itself a kind of assurance of such quality. 197 However,
because for-profit entities are not eligible for charity status, a factual
characteristic upon which the social mission of the entity could be as-
196 Id. at 150-51, 173.
197 Hansmann, supra note 15, at 845; see also Corporate Creativity, supra note 14,
at 70.
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sessed would be missing unless the social mission is recognized inde-
pendently of the legal structure solely on the basis of doing good.
Suppose our hypothetical social venture does not have a spin-
off charitable effect collecting money to subsidize its operations, does
not organize flag days, and requires beneficiaries to pay a symbolic
premium for the shoes which might not be seen as a charitable mission
by everybody. Without proper branding of its mission via the appropri-
ate vehicle, it would, by no means, attract as many donors to pay the
price premium as it would with such a vehicle in place."' Of course,
particular products or services offered by for-profit businesses com-
monly bear private labels indicating social goals. In the absence of any
guidelines and rules, whether governmental or from business indus-
try, this labeling can be misleading and wrongfully induce customers.
The application for recognition of the charitable goals by public au-
thorities would efficiently address this question outside consumer pol-
icy law.
As to the practical reasons, we can briefly address the most vi-
tal. The criteria for determining the eligibility for privileges should be
the social goals as stated in the articles of association and as effec-
tively perceived by the entity. More privileges may imply more report-
ing, disclosure, and paperwork obligations. Frankly, what we refer to
as the "degrees of privileges" could, in practice, come down to a simple
application system under which certain answers are checked with"yes" or "no" and submitted together with all relevant attachments,
such as annual reports and receipts. Official approval of the recogni-
tion of the charitable goals should take place ex ante before the com-
mencement of every year and should make the business organization
eligible to call itself a social venture for the duration of the coming
year. The privilege to make deductions would be effective after ap-
proval is granted, and any deductions of charitable expenditures
would have to be specifically documented in the profits tax declaration
of the relevant year. Issued receipts for donors would have to be duly
registered and cross-checked with deductions reported by donors in
their profits/salaries tax declarations.
3.8. Conclusion
In this section, we faced the challenge of how to decouple privi-
leges of doing good efforts, which are currently exclusively linked to
the status of not-for-profit organizations, and came up with a straight-
forward suggestion of how this could be done. First, we identified those
provisions which link the status of the business organization to the
availability of privileges and proposed that they should be decoupled.
These privileges are: (i) profits tax, (ii) tax deductions, (iii) fundraising
198 Corporate Creativity, supra note 14, at 92.
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through donations, (iv) non-distribution constraint, and (v) registra-
tion/supervision of business organizations. Then, we found that gen-
eral profits tax exemptions appeared to be an inappropriate solution in
general and should not be sustained even for not-for-profit organiza-
tions. The same applies to the limited deductibility of social expendi-
tures which is incoherent in its application and therefore is
questionable as well. On the general principle that all socially-oriented
transfers can be deducted, we then proposed a practical system in
which parts of the generated profits can be distributed to stakeholders
when non-distribution constraints are designed with more flexibility.
We completed our proposal with a multi-stage registration system
which allowed the implementation of these propositions.
4. ENDING A MISSION
Many of the social ventures now operating in Hong Kong will
at some point abandon their mission, not only because of take-over at-
tempts and dilution of ownership, but also because the original foun-
ders may retire or their socially-oriented motivation may become
exhausted. Social ventures now both managed and owned by socially-
driven founders will seek capital raising opportunities and will gradu-
ally become diluted. Some will seek private investors, while others will
go public and may be exposed to frequent take-over attempts.' 99
Brands recognized as socially responsible tempt potential purchasers
and risk abandoning the social mission after the takeover.2 0 0 The busi-
ness model that initially works well may eventually not work so well
and, with a lack of new ideas, some social ventures will face winding
up too.201 These scenarios will not be foreign to Hong Kong if the social
venture sector keeps its enthusiasm and growth. Hong Kong is the
headquarters and hub for transnational profit driven "Goliaths" that
compete with socially driven "Davids." The former might be eager to
devour brands built by the latter. Ideally, it is the market that sets the
pace for generational change among social entrepreneurs and social
projects, particularly in Hong Kong, the world's freest economy.2 °2 We
therefore do not see anything inherently wrong if social ventures, even
199 See generally James E. Austin & Herman B. Leonard, Can the Virtuous Mouse
and the Wealthy Elephant Live Happily Ever After?, 51 CAL. MGMT. REV. 77 (2008).200 Consumers prefer socially responsible and environmentally sustainable prod-
ucts and services. See Plerhoples, supra note 22, at 235 (noting that profit-maxi-
mizing companies expand by acquiring established companies rather than starting
their own).
201 See Corporate Creativity, supra note 14, at 219-20 (referring to the challenges
to "long-term survival of for-profit social enterprises").202 2013 Index of Economic Freedom, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, http://www.her-
itage.org/index (last visited Mar. 4, 2013) (noting that Hong Kong is ranked num-
ber one in economic freedom among countries around the world).
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landmarks, disappear from Hong Kong. In that event, however, we ex-
amine some specific problems in the following.
A case to learn from abroad is the well-known story of the ac-
quisition of premium ice-cream producer Ben & Jerry by Unilever in
2000.203 Since the early 1980s, Ben & Jerry has been a social venture
with a multi-faceted mission covering policies against growth hormone
in stock raising, eco-friendly packaging, usage of fair-trade certified
products, payment of decent wages for employees, support-for same
sex marriages, and donating 7.5% of pre-tax profits to charity.2 ° 4 De-
creasing stock prices resulting from clients averting from fatty prod-
ucts and reconsidering the company's commitment to social mission
invited take-over bids by larger players in 2000.205 Among those,
Unilever's offer was the highest, although it was less promising in
terms of sustaining the social mission.20 6
Whether the shareholders' wealth maximization paradigm du-
ties under Revlon required Ben & Jerry's founders to sell or whether
the offer was simply too tempting to resist has dominated the transac-
tion's legal discourse.20 7 Katz and Paige, who strongly argued for a
distinction between the prevention against hostile takeovers and the
preservation of a social mission,2 0 8 concluded that none of the prem-
ises triggering the Revlon duties occurred in this de facto case that
forced Ben & Jerry's management to accept Unilever's offer. According
to them, two scenarios were likely. First, Ben & Jerry's management
accepted the highest offer in fear of personal liability because "constit-
uency statutes" shielding against Revlon duties had not yet been
tested in courts.20 9 Constituency statutes allow directors to take other
factors into consideration, such as employees, suppliers, customers,
the economy of the region, and community. They also include the "pos-
sibility that these interests may be best served by the continued inde-
pendence of the corporation" which de facto overruled the Revlon
203 Plerhoples, supra note 22, at 236 (analyzing the purchase of Ben & Jerry's by
Unilever).
204 Corporate Creativity, supra note 14, at 219-223.
205 Id. at 225-26 (referring to offers by Dreyer's, a competing ice cream manufac-
turer, and Hot Fudge Partners).
206 See id. at 225-228 (referring to willingness to donate pretax profits to charity
for a minimum of five more years).
207 See id. at 235-36 (stating that none of the Revlon triggers to maximize share-
holder value applied to Ben & Jerry's).
208 Id. at 249.
209 Corporate Creativity, supra note 14, at 236-37, 241 (referring to a lawsuit that
could potentially go to the Vermont Supreme Court where Ben & Jerry's might
lose).
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duties.2 1 ° In the second scenario, the founders accepted the tender
with the risk of abandoning the social mission.2 1 1 Yet, a possible sce-
nario is not possible to prove.
Interestingly, Ben & Jerry's mission was mostly sustained af-
ter the takeover. Generally, environmental considerations were up-
held, while more costly social missions were gradually abandoned.2 12
Although a portion of Ben & Jerry's mission has been lost, its expan-
sion by Unilever potentially generates more good than had been possi-
ble prior to the acquisition.2 1 3
What are the lessons we can draw from this case for Hong
Kong? Suspension of the social mission is nothing bad and may come
naturally as social ventures further establish their market presence.
An acquisition of a make money and do good business might lead to a
compromise between making money and doing good, naturally favor-
ing the money approach, but in turn may also support the expansion of
the ability for doing good. Unless the Hong Kong government offers
any special privileges to social ventures, the government's concern
should not go beyond mere wishes that these socially contributing en-
terprises may be able to preserve their mission in the best possible
way. But, in the current situation, where social ventures are discour-
aged rather than encouraged from a legal point of view, there is noth-
ing to worry about if doing good is suspended. Ending the mission is
their private matter.
However, if, as under our proposal, the legislator introduced a
more encouraging system for social ventures which allowed a
decoupling of privileges,2 4 the situation would be different. In that
case, social ventures enjoy special privileges and could no longer be
seen as purely proprietary to their founders, as even though the public
does not own any shares in the social ventures, it holds some kind of
stake in them.215 This stake, let's call it reliance-stake, has the same
210 See id. at 236 (stating that many states passed constituency statutes that re-
quired directors to consider the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders regard-
less of the benefit to shareholders); see also Plerhoples, supra note 22, at 238
(discussing Vermont's constituency statute that preempted the acquisition and ap-
plication of shareholder wealth maximization norms because of the potential loss
of business and jobs in Vermont).
211 See id. at 243 (suggesting that Ben & Jerry's sale failed to ensure that the
social mission would survive).
212 See id. at 244-48 (referring to Ben & Jerry's continued involvement in progres-
sive initiatives, such as voter registration and reduction of its carbon footprint
contrasted to the abandonment of corporate donations to charities).
213 Id. at 250 (referring to the "pro-social equilibrium in the ice cream market that
generates greater social value . . . than the status quo.").
214 See supra, section 3.4.
215 Admittedly, in very general terms which cannot be further specified here.
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value as that from which the social venture has benefitted in the form
of tax reductions from the government.2 1 6 Thereby, it is not the abso-
lute reliance-stake, but the relative reliance-stake which the social
venture enjoyed in proportion to its overall revenue. In other words,
assets accumulated as a result of privileges should not be paid out to
owners when the social venture is being wound up or relinquishes its
mission.
Problematically, however, in the bipolar world of entities
where for-profit entities are proprietary and not-for-profit entities are
not, partly-proprietary vehicles do not exist.2 1 7 With the preferences of
social ventures of choosing a for-profit entity as their vehicle, all re-
maining assets, if any, would naturally fall back to the shareholders
after the business organization was liquidated. This is further prob-
lematic in the case of hybrid companies, where the for-profit entity is
connected with the not-for-profit company in such a way that it could
grab its assets back in case the not-for-profit company is being liqui-
dated. The business organization could then pursue its social mission
as a new not-for-profit company without being liable for the reliance-
interest. In this context, mission driven for-profit projects like
google.org 21 s have been scrutinized for being advertised as charitable
even though its parent company Google, Inc. could merge its asset
back at any moment.21 9 Nevertheless, again, as long as google.org does
not enjoy any privileges, there is no point in resenting at such
plausibility.
In contrast, traditional charities in principle are subjected to
special regimes precluding stakeholders, managers, or directors from
appropriating outstanding assets. In common law jurisdictions, this
instance is generally governed by the cy-pr~s doctrine which in Hong
Kong, unlike many countries elsewhere, has not yet been converted
into statutory regulation.2 2 ° Originally developed for charitable trusts,
the cy-pr~s doctrine sets forth that if the trust can no longer carry out
the purposes for which it initially was established, the court can order
that the property of the trust be used for a purpose nearest to the in-
tention of the donor.22 1 This doctrine has been applied in the way that
entities approved under Section 88 need to mandate the distribution of
216 See supra, section 3.6.
217 See Corporate Creativity, supra note 14, at 67.
218 See About, GOOGLE.ORG, http://www.google.org/about.html (last visited Apr. 3,
2013).
219 See Law & Choice, supra note 14, at 361. See also Malani & Posner, supra note
17, at 2019-22.
220 See CHARITIES SUBCOMM., supra note 12, at 152, pt. 11.2 & 156, 11.15.
221 See id. at 152, pt. 11.3.
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remaining assets to other Section 88 organizations in case of
liquidation. 22 2
The Law Commission also considered this topic and proposed
that the cy-pr~s doctrine shall trigger if (i) property transferred for a
specific charitable purpose has failed, and the donors are either un-
known or have waived their rights to have the property returned; (ii)
property is transferred for a specific charitable purpose in response to
a solicitation stipulating that in the event of the solicited purposes fail-
ing, cy-pr~s doctrine would apply as if the property were transferred
for general charitable rather than specific purposes; or (iii) a charita-
ble body has dissolved.22 3
If the cy-pr~s doctrine or similar statutory solutions were to be
applicable to social ventures, one important issue would need to be re-
solved. In what proportion the remaining assets have to be appor-
tioned, what portion should be subjected to the cy-pr~s regime, and
what could be paid back to the shareholders? Put otherwise, it would
need to be resolved how this doctrine can be applied partially. In the
case of British law, for instance, it has been decided that upon dissolu-
tion of such vehicles, investors would only be entitled to get back their
original capital contributions 22 4 which Katz and Page compared to
holding preferred stock.22 5 That is a practical and easy solution, but
not sufficiently flexible to cover the whole spectrum of social ventures,
because it would again discourage investors who seek investment op-
portunities with decent reasonable return.
Instead, we propose that in the case of the suspension of doing
good, the assets should first be divided with regards to the reliance-
interest as proposed above, and then the cy-pr~s regime would only be
applied to the proportion qualified as reliance-interest stake. This
would apply in both cases of a liquidation following a simple suspen-
sion of the social mission as well as a liquidation following an insol-
vency proceeding. In the first case, upon suspension of the business or
loss of official social ventures status, the social venture would be
obliged to transfer the reliance-interest stake to other recognized char-
itable organizations in Hong Kong. The business organization could
then pursue the new money-driven mission vested in the old entity. In
the second case, the reliance-stake would probably be awarded the
222 INLAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, TAX INFORMATION: CHARITABLE DONATIONS AND
TAx-ExEMPT CHARITIES: A TAx GUIDE FOR CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS AND TRUSTS
OF A PUBLIC CHARACTER, pt. 9.
223 CHARITIES SUBCOMM., supra note 12, at 165, Recommendation 17.
224 As it is the case with the Community Interest Company. See The Community
Interest Company Regulations, 2005, S.I. 1788, art. 6, 23 (U.K.).
225 Katz & Page, supra note 29, at 1371; see also Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity
Law's Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 37 (2011).
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same creditor treatment as the shareholders and no distinction is sug-
gested to be made between them. If necessary, both stakes would be
proportionately reduced. Reliance-stake, if any, would be transferred
to the other charitable organization, and the stake of the equity holder,
if any, would return to them.
CONCLUSION
Social ventures live a mystical existence in Hong Kong. None-
theless, we attempted to bring some clarity to this phenomenon which
has been until now a fully ignored subject of law. We gave an overview
on the social venture sector in Hong Kong and examined that it is full
of ambition and filled with potential once the legal problems are
solved. These problems are complex and numerous and we tried to
treat them in three chapters.
In the first chapter, we identified three basic problems as to
social ventures in Hong Kong: the lack of a correct definition of making
money, the confusion around the charitable objects, and the meaning
of doing good, on which social ventures can pursue their mission.
Based on this, we put forward a typology of social ventures comprising
four features: the source of income, the concept of donation, the distri-
bution of profits, and the creation of good. Further, we identified im-
perfect social ventures, where these four features are not equally
present and argued that the presence of three features is sometimes
sufficient to constitute a social venture.
Then, we looked into the second major problem which social
ventures operating in Hong Kong experience and under which we ex-
amined the phenomenon of coupled privileges. We found that the cur-
rent system of profits tax and deductions which are coupled with the
legal status of an entity does not take social ventures into considera-
tion and argued that every business organization should, in principle,
pay profits tax but, in turn, deduct gratuitous transfers and charitable
premiums. As a result, profits tax would only be paid if profits of a
social venture are distributed to the investors and not reinvested in
their social mission. Following this perception, we elaborated a system
under which social ventures can be registered and taxation privileges
efficiently assigned by a one-stop supervisory body.
In the last chapter, where we looked at the instance of social
ventures abandoning their mission of doing good, we developed a sys-
tem under which business organizations can easily adopt or abandon a
social mission based on a partial application of the cy-prs doctrine.
This, as we argued, is essential, when social ventures want to enjoy
governmental privileges and specifically be able to make tax deduc-
tions as put forward in our proposal.
